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ARTICLES
RESTRICTING TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM:
EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST JUSTIFICATIONS
Daniel B. Kelly*
The organizing principle of American succession law—testamentary
freedom—gives decedents a nearly unrestricted right to dispose of property.
After surveying the justifications for testamentary freedom, I examine the
circumstances in which it may be socially beneficial for courts to alter
wills, trusts, and other gratuitous transfers at death: imperfect information,
negative externalities, and intergenerational equity. These justifications
correspond with many existing limitations on the freedom of testation. Yet,
disregarding donor intent to maximize the donees’ ex post interests, an
increasingly common justification for intervention, is socially undesirable.
Doing so ignores important ex ante considerations, including a donor’s
happiness, a donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest, and the structure
and timing of a donor’s gifts. If donors believe courts may not facilitate
their intent, donors may be less happy, accumulate less property, and alter
gifts during life. Moreover, because the law often affects donor behavior,
ignoring donative intent to benefit particular donees may harm not only the
donors but also donees as a class. Thus, the living may themselves benefit
if the law allows a certain degree of “dead hand” control.
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“The brutal fact remains: the dead are definitively dead. The dead
‘control’ beyond the grave only insofar as living people let them do so. In
the long run, the dead run nothing.”1
“How, possibly, can the ‘use’ of a dead person, albeit through the use of
another, have normative force? Though we appear to respect the
intentions of the dead, we may be fools to do so.”2

INTRODUCTION
The law generally defers to owners in deciding how to use their property.
One justification for this deference is that owners typically internalize the
benefits and costs of their actions. Therefore, an owner’s private incentive
to use property often will coincide with its socially optimal use. Similarly,
the law usually defers to donors in deciding the nature, timing, and
recipients of gifts, including gifts at death. For example, in interpreting a
will or trust,3 the “controlling consideration” is the donor’s intention.4 One
justification for privileging donative intent, like the justification for
deferring to owners in how they use their property, is that doing so will
promote social welfare.5
Testamentary freedom has several advantages. Transferring property at
death functions as another use of property; consequently, effectuating a
donor’s intent should maximize the donor’s happiness. Testamentary
freedom also aligns an individual’s incentive to work, save, and invest with
what is socially optimal, promoting capital accumulation and long-term
productivity. In addition, a donor may have more information than either a
legislature or court about the optimal distribution of property to family
members or other donees. Finally, testamentary freedom may have benefits
for familial relationships by increasing parental control over children or
1. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
INHERITANCE LAW 182 (2009).
2. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 99 (1997).
3. A donor may transfer property via a will (testator) or trust (settlor), and a donee may
receive property by means of a will (devisee) or trust (beneficiary). While the trust is a
common technique for avoiding probate and allocating property, the analysis in this Article
could apply to a range of nonprobate transfers including not only revocable trusts but also
life insurance policies and brokerage or retirement accounts with beneficiary designations.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (2003) (“[L]aw does not grant courts any general authority to question the wisdom,
fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or her
property.”).
5. On social welfare and the assumptions of welfare economics, see infra note 51. On
why a property owner’s private incentive to use property may converge with the socially
optimal result, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347 (1967). An owner’s private incentive may diverge from the socially optimal result
if the owner’s use entails a negative (or positive) effect on others. In the context of donating
property (rather than using it), there is also a concern about both external costs, see infra Part
III.A.2 (discussing justifications for restricting testamentary freedom based on the existence
of “negative externalities”), and external benefits. See Louis Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts,
88 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 284 (1998) (“Gifts convey a sort of positive externality on donees”
(citing Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469 (1995) [hereinafter
Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts], and A.B. Atkinson, Capital Taxes, the Redistribution
of Wealth and Individual Savings, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 209 (1971))).
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encouraging children to care for parents. Given these benefits, as well as
the costs of attempting to prohibit donative transfers, a system of succession
based on the freedom of disposition is arguably the “least objectionable
arrangement for dealing with property on the owner’s death.”6
Yet the law does not privilege donative intent in all circumstances.
Courts may alter a gift by refusing to enforce the provisions of a will,
modifying or terminating a trust, or interpreting the terms of a will or trust.
Is such intervention warranted? If so, under what circumstances should the
courts intervene? Using insights from the economic analysis of law, this
Article examines the justifications for restricting testamentary freedom and
the circumstances in which it may be socially desirable or undesirable for
the law to alter wills, trusts, and other gratuitous transfers at death.
My thesis has two parts: (1) there are several legitimate justifications for
legal intervention in donative transfers at death, including (in theory)
imperfect information, negative externalities, and intergenerational equity;
however, (2) intervening to maximize the donees’ ex post interests is not a
legitimate justification for disregarding a donor’s wishes. Clarifying the
justifications for legal intervention in donative transfers at death has payoffs
for legislatures, courts, and law reformers.7
Consider three justifications for restricting testamentary freedom. First,
due to imperfect information, including unforeseen as well as unprovidedfor contingencies, altering a will or trust may be desirable. Suppose a donor
(D) leaves money for the cure of polio. Twenty years later, scientists
discover a cure.8 Reallocating D’s gift (e.g., to find the cure for another
disease) is likely to be socially beneficial, and consistent with D’s probable
intent, even if D did not provide for this contingency in her will or trust.
Second, if a gift entails negative externalities, intervening may be
desirable if the private incentive to give diverges from the socially optimal
result. Suppose D has $10 million but D’s spouse (S) and minor child (C)
have $0. Assume S and C will receive public support if D disinherits them.
Knowing this, D may reduce or eliminate a gift to S and C. As a result, the
law may require that D provide some minimal level of support.9
6. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1–4, in DEATH, TAXES AND
FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).
7. Legal intervention can be either legislative (e.g., a state legislature’s enactment of an
elective share) or judicial (a state court’s modification of a trust). Probate and state courts
often base their decisions on statutory law, as well as the Restatements and Uniform Codes,
so the rules of succession can and will affect the circumstances in which a court intervenes.
Thus, while I will speak often of “courts” and “judicial” intervention, my analysis is relevant
not only, or even primarily, to judges, but also to legislatures and law reformers.
8. Between 1950 and 1963, Hilary Koprowski, Jonas Salk, and Albert Sabin
independently developed polio vaccines. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN
STORY 268 (2005).
9. In the United States, all separate property states, except Georgia, provide a spousal
elective share. See Verner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process:
The Surviving Spouse, Year’s Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 458
(1976). Yet, no state, except Louisiana, has a forced share for minor children. See Ralph C.
Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L.
REV. 1, 23 (1996).
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Third, legal intervention may be necessary due to considerations of
intergenerational equity. Given its priority in time, the present generation
may have an incentive, as well as the ability, to control property in ways
that favor its own interests to the detriment of future generations.
Assuming the measure of social welfare gives significant weight to the
well-being of future generations, the private incentive of a donor living
today may again diverge from the socially optimal result.10
After exploring these justifications for restricting testamentary freedom,
this Article argues that another justification—disregarding donative intent
to maximize the donees’ ex post interests—is socially undesirable.11 This
justification is increasingly common in the law of succession.12 However,
allowing a court to maximize a donee’s welfare ex post is problematic for it
fails to incorporate ex ante considerations. These considerations include,
among other things, a donor’s happiness during life, the donor’s incentive
to work, save, and invest, and the structure and timing of a donor’s gifts.
Failing to incorporate ex ante considerations into the legal analysis is
problematic because ex ante considerations can affect the interests of the
donors as well as donees. For example, if courts disregard donative intent
at death, donors may be less happy during life, and this decrease in donor
happiness may outweigh any increase in donee happiness.13 In addition,
disregarding donative intent may harm the donees themselves. In response
to the possibility of legal intervention, a donor may alter her behavior. For
example, if D believes courts will not facilitate her intent, D may consume
more during life. If D owns less property at death, the donees will inherit
less wealth. Moreover, if D anticipates that a court will intervene and
ignore her intent, D may alter her disposition by making a gift during life,
choosing different donees, or forgoing the gift entirely.14 As a result, even
10. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (2004).
11. Focusing exclusively on the donees’ welfare ex post is problematic, notwithstanding
a trustee’s duty to manage a trust on behalf of beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 78(1) (2007) (“[A] trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiaries, or solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose.”); cf. John H. Langbein,
Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J.
929, 980–82 (2005) (discussing a trustee’s obligation to act in the “best interests” of the
beneficiaries).
12. See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 215, 216 (2011) (“American trust law, after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving
in a new direction, with a reassertion of the interests and rights of the beneficiaries.”); cf.
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996)
(“A careful review of case law . . . reveals that many courts do not exalt testamentary
freedom above all other principles.”).
13. Although fairly straightforward, this insight illustrates the flaws in a common
argument for interfering with a bequest: “The donor is dead. Ignore the dead guy’s wishes,
and let’s do whatever is best for the living.” See Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the Rule
Against Perpetuities: Federal and State Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2537, 2548–49 (2006) (“I can’t believe that reverence for some dead guy’s intent is
going to determine major outcomes.”). Such an argument could be sound only if one
assumes that a particular donor, while alive, believes the law will facilitate her wishes, even
though courts are often unwilling to facilitate the wishes of others.
14. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 66 (“[L]egal policies controlling inheritance can be
partially circumvented by increases in inter vivos gifts. For example, were a law to require
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if individual donees have an incentive to attempt to modify a donor’s gift in
particular cases, donees may be worse off as a class if courts restrict
testamentary freedom while ignoring important ex ante considerations.15
In some respects, the justifications for intervening to alter wills and trusts
are analogous to the justifications for modifying or interpreting contracts.
Contract scholars have analyzed similar issues that arise because parties are
unable to anticipate future contingencies or may not wish to incur the costs
of specifying additional contingencies even if they are foreseeable.16 Thus,
insights from contract law may be useful in analyzing succession law.17
Yet, succession law involves an issue that is usually absent in contract law:
dead hand control.18 Indeed, unlike in contract law, “renegotiation” with
the donor is no longer feasible in wills, trusts, and estates.19

that half of a person’s property pass to the person’s spouse and children, the person could
transfer much of his wealth to an alternative preferred donee during his life.”). The concern
is that restricting testamentary freedom without incorporating ex ante considerations may
reduce the “size of the pie” by distorting various incentives of donors and donees, including
decisions about saving versus consuming, working versus not working, giving later versus
giving now, and the like. The question of the extent to which various doctrines in succession
law distort these incentives is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
15. To alter a bequest or modify a trust for their own benefit, individual donees may
have an incentive to litigate. But if a court disregards donative intent, litigation may harm
donees as a class because the incentive of particular donees is not necessarily aligned with
the overall interests of donees. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 659 (2004) (making this point in the context of trust modification
and termination). It is also worth noting that the class of donors or donees is not static, as
the donees in one generation are likely to become the donors for the next generation.
16. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006); see also Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in
1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 68–99 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007) (discussing incomplete contracts).
17. On trusts as contracts, see John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995). See also Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions
of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447–50
(1998); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 844–45 (2001).
18. In its modern usage, dead hand control refers to the idea that a person who has died
may continue to assert control over his or her property even after death. See FRIEDMAN,
supra note 1, at 4 (discussing postmortem control by the dead). Postmortem control is
possible both at the time of death (via a will) and for many years after death (via a trust). See
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 467 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
1978) (1766) (“To give a man power over his property after his death is very considerable,
but it is nothing [compared] to an extension of this power to the end of the world.”); John H.
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004)
(“The distinctive attribute of a trust is that it can and commonly does perpetuate the settlor’s
autonomy after his or her death (hence the dead-hand label).”). Originally, the term “dead
hand” most likely referred to a donee, not the donor, especially a donee who was not able to
perform certain feudal obligations. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 67 n.67 (“[T]he term
‘dead hand’ originally referred to the donee, notably, to a religious corporation that had been
granted land.” (citing LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 2–3 (1955))).
19. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 699 (8th ed. 2010) (noting the
impossibility of “recontracting” in wills, trusts, and estates).
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This issue—the extent to which the law should facilitate the wishes of the
dead over the lives of the living—is a perennial one.20 And debates about
the scope of dead hand control are not merely of philosophical or historical
interest.21 Estimates suggest that, in the United States alone, at least $41
trillion will pass between generations from 1998 to 2052.22 The magnitude
of this potential wealth transfer is due, in part, to the “baby boomers,” the
generation of Americans born between 1946 and 1964.23 However, there is
no evidence to suggest that these “baby boomers” will be less inclined to
assert postmortem control over their property, and some evidence to suggest
that incentive trusts, which allow a settlor to delineate the terms and
conditions of a gift, continue to be a common estate planning technique.24
Moreover, because several states have recently abolished the rule against
perpetuities (RAP), thereby clearing the way for “perpetual” or “dynasty”
trusts,25 there is renewed interest in the dead hand among legislatures and
courts as well as legal scholars and law reformers.26

20. Thomas Jefferson, in writing to James Madison, argued that the question of “whether
one generation of men has a right to bind another,” including intergenerational transfers of
land, is a “question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also among
the fundamental principles of every government.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 103 (H.A. Washington
ed., N.Y., John C. Riker 1854); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1998) (discussing Jefferson’s letter to Madison and noting
Jefferson “argues against all inherited obligations, including those of inherited laws”).
21. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 4, 179 (noting that, while “it has suffered greatly
from scholarly neglect,” succession law and questions “about the rights and powers, the
scope and limits, of the dead hand” are of “immense importance socially, culturally, and
economically”).
22. See John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer
Estimate Is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Comments, 7 GIFT PLAN. 1 (2003).
23. See GRAYSON K. VINCENT & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE
NEXT FOUR DECADES: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 TO 2050
(2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p25-1138.pdf.
24. Although the empirical data is limited, one estate planning survey suggests that 57
percent of Americans with $10 million or more in assets and 42 percent of Americans with
$5 to $9.9 million in assets utilize an incentive trust. PNC FIN. SERVS. GRP., INC., PNC
WEALTH MANAGEMENT WEALTH AND VALUES SURVEY: INHERITANCE HIGHLIGHTS 2007, at 2
(2007), available at https://www.pnc.com/webapp/unsec/Requester?resource=/wps/wcm/
connect/aba13c004e5c6f3e8f078ffc6d630ad7/PNC_WV_Inheritance_Highlights.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES&CACHEID=aba13c004e5c6f3e8f078ffc6d630ad7.
25. See generally Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust,
50 UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2003) (discussing perpetual trusts). On the rise of perpetual trusts
and abolition of the RAP, see generally Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2465 (2006), and Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for
Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005).
26. In response to such developments, many legal scholars have not only denounced
dynasty trusts, but have also hypothesized that American law is ceding too much power to
the deceased. See, e.g., RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY? PROPERTY AND THE
DEAD HAND 116 (2007) (“[D]ynasty trusts have negative effects both for their living
beneficiaries and for American society.”); RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW:
THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 82 (2010) (“[D]ynasty trusts have the capacity
to impose considerable societal harm.”); Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged
to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1160–61 (2011) (stating that permitting “private trusts
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Thus, this Article analyzes the justifications for restricting testamentary
freedom. There are few attempts to analyze the issue systematically,27
especially from a functional perspective.28 This lack of functional analysis
is surprising, given the potential benefits of applying economic insights to
succession law.29 Moreover, from recent books like Immortality and the
Law: The Rising Power of the American Dead to articles such as But I
Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, a number of scholars have
argued (with some force) that the legal system cedes too much control to
the dead.30 This Article contends that nearly the opposite may be true:
while perpetual trusts and other forms of dead hand control can be
problematic,31 there is also a risk of disregarding donative intent and
restricting testamentary freedom in ways that are socially detrimental and
that harm donors as well as their potential donees.
Part I provides an overview of American succession law, including the
principle of testamentary freedom, its economic justifications, and its legal
limitations. Part II explains why the ex ante perspective is relevant for
analyzing succession law and highlights a number of ex ante considerations
that are often overlooked. Part III investigates justifications for restricting
testamentary freedom: imperfect information, negative externalities, and
to be perpetual is loony” and noting that “the only real beneficiaries will be the trustees and
the lawyers”).
27. For a summary of some of the primary arguments for restricting the dead hand, see
Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1257–64 (1985). For an earlier treatment, see SIMES, supra note 18.
28. For a concise analysis of economic arguments for and against dead hand control, see
SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68–72. See also Halbach, supra note 6, at 5–8 (outlining
economic justifications for inheritance); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A
Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5–18 (1992) (discussing rationales for
testamentary freedom as well as objections and qualifications). There is a vast literature on
estate taxation, but my primary focus is on other limitations on testamentary freedom, and I
discuss the issue of taxation only briefly. See infra notes 178–79, 184, 187, 254, 295–97 and
accompanying text.
29. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855 (2012); cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of
Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2253 (2011) (“[T]he field of wills remains
underdeveloped theoretically [because s]cholars have rarely tilled its soil with the
implements of interdisciplinary analysis . . . .”). For an example incorporating the idea of
agency costs into trust law, see Sitkoff, supra note 15. Sitkoff, as well as Max
Schanzenbach and Jonathan Klick, have led the way in the economic analysis of trusts,
including a number of important empirical studies. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Robert H.
Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s
Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2008); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did
Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. &
ECON. 681 (2007).
30. See, e.g., MADOFF, supra note 26, at 154 (discussing the “rising power of the
American dead” and arguing that “deference to the wishes of the dead imposes significant
costs on living individuals and threatens our most fundamental societal values”); Ascher,
supra note 26, at 1149 (maintaining that “certain trends in the law of the dead have
threatened to put us sharply at odds with Jefferson’s vision” that “‘the earth belongs . . . to
the living’”).
31. For an argument for limiting the dead hand in the context of perpetual trusts and the
RAP, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27
introductory note (2011).
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intergenerational equity. I contend that, while these justifications can be
consistent with increasing social welfare, disregarding donative intent to
maximize the donees’ ex post interests is undesirable. Part IV analyzes
legal restrictions on testamentary freedom and evaluates the extent to which
these restrictions are consistent with the economic justifications.
I. STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN SUCCESSION LAW
Understanding American succession law requires an understanding of its
organizing principle, testamentary freedom. The freedom of disposition is
central in the law of wills as well as trusts. After discussing the role of
testamentary freedom in succession law (Part I.A), I outline several of the
primary economic justifications for testamentary freedom (Part I.B) and
examine the current legal restrictions on testamentary freedom (Part I.C).
A. The Organizing Principle: Testamentary Freedom
It may well be that “the institution of inheritance is universal,”32 but,
historically, legal systems diverge on the institutional mechanisms for
facilitating the intergenerational transfer of private property. Unlike laws
that rely on primogeniture,33 require equal division,34 or attempt to abolish
inheritance,35 the “organizing principle” of American succession law is the
“freedom of disposition” or testamentary freedom.36 Testamentary freedom
is “the idea that a person has the right to choose who will succeed to things
of value left behind at death.”37 Freedom of testation is “a characteristically

32. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1369 n.270 (1993)
(citing PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, HUMAN FAMILY SYSTEMS 89 (1979)); see also Halbach,
supra note 6, at 4 (“[S]ome form of inheritance is virtually a universal institution of ancient
and modern societies.”).
33. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 382–83 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776)
(explaining primogeniture’s origins in medieval Europe).
34. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1038 (Batoche Books
2001) (1848) (opining that equal division laws are “very seriously objectionable”).
35. See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in KARL MARX:
SELECTED WRITINGS 221, 237 (David McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1848)
(advocating “[a]bolition of all right of inheritance”); see also Frances Foster-Simons, The
Development of Inheritance Law in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, 33
AM. J. COMP. L. 33, 36–37 (1985) (discussing how the U.S.S.R. “began the process of
institutionalizing inheritance” in 1922, only four years after “the Soviet regime officially
abolished the right”).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (2003); see also Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (“The organizing principle of the
American law of succession, both probate and nonprobate, is freedom of disposition.”).
37. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 9, 12. Testamentary freedom, i.e., a donor’s
right to select beneficiaries is technically distinct from the freedom of inheritance, i.e., a
donee’s right to receive property or donor’s right to avoid confiscation. See Hirsch & Wang,
supra note 28, at 6 n.16; see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 168
(1974) (distinguishing between the “right to inherit” and the “right to bequeath”).
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modern idea—it was and is rare in simpler societies; but it is a leading
principle in the United States and most western countries.”38
While different countries have embraced different conceptions of
testamentary freedom,39 succession law in the United States gives donors a
“nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.”40
American succession law privileges “donor’s intention” as the “controlling
consideration” in determining the meaning of a donative document.41 As
the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers
emphasizes, the “law does not grant courts any general authority to question
the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how
to allocate his or her property.”42 The function of succession law is to
“facilitate rather than regulate.”43 Similarly, the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC) provides that one of the Code’s “underlying purposes and policies”
is “to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of
his property.”44
The idea of testamentary freedom is central not only in wills but also in
trusts. Many courts emphasize that, just as the court’s role in interpreting a
will is to facilitate a testator’s intent, the role of the court in construing a
trust is to effectuate the settlor’s intent.45 Historically, donative intent has
been a “defining force in trust law—the ‘polestar’ which guided all aspects
of trust administration.”46 Thus, for both wills and trusts, the freedom of
testation—“the dead hand’s right to decide how property will be handled
after a person dies”—is the “basic principle” of succession law.47
38. Friedman, supra note 37, at 12.
39. See, e.g., JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 21–82 (Thomas Dunlap trans., 2008)
(comparing testamentary freedom in France, Germany, and the United States); Joshua C.
Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 137–
42 (2008) (discussing how the American approach to disinheritance of children “contrasts
sharply with those of civil law and Commonwealth jurisdictions”).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a.
41. Id. § 10.1 (“[A] donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by
law.”).
42. Id. § 10.1 cmt. c.
43. Id.
44. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(2), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 26 (2010); see also id. art. II
prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 75 (noting a “decline of formalism in favor of intent-serving
policies”); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous
Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 874–75 (1992).
45. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 896 (Ill. 2009) (emphasizing a
“public policy favoring testamentary freedom”); Thorson v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 740 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Neb. 2007) (concluding that the “primary rule” is that “a court
must, if possible, ascertain the intention of the testator or creator”); In re Lowy, 931 A.2d
552, 556 (N.H. 2007) (pointing out that the settlor’s intention is “paramount”).
46. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and
the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (2008) (citing In re
Sherman Trust, 179 N.W. 109, 112 (Iowa 1920) (citing Wilberding v. Miller, 106 N.E. 665,
667 (Ohio 1913))); see also Bryan v. Dethlefs, 959 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (“The polestar of trust or will interpretation is the settlor’s intent.”).
47. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 19; see also Paula A. Monopoli, Toward Equality:
Nonmarital Children and the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 995, 1010
n.94 (2012) (“Freedom of testation and testator’s intent are frequently identified as
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B. Economic Justifications for Testamentary Freedom
Most scholars today emphasize a view of testamentary freedom that is
rooted in positive law and justified by functional considerations.48 This
functional perspective emphasizes the “social welfare” of the parties and
seeks to determine how the law can create the best incentives for the donor,
donees, and other parties that a donor’s disposition of property may affect.49
Under this economic or functional approach, there are several justifications
for privileging testamentary freedom.50
First, the freedom of testation maximizes donor satisfaction. As Edward
Halbach puts it,
[A] society should be concerned with the total amount of happiness it can
offer, and to many of its members it is a great comfort and satisfaction to
know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can
be provided for and may be able to enjoy better lives because of the
inheritance that can be left to them.51

paramount jurisprudential touchstones in the area of trusts and estates.”); Sitkoff, supra note
36; cf. Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 29, at 824 (noting that, even in charitable trusts, the
“presumption should be in favor of the donor’s intent”).
48. See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the
Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 432 (2001) (characterizing “[the] view which posits
that testamentary freedom . . . is a privilege offered for the purpose of motivating socially
desirable behavior” as the “most prevalent justification for testamentary freedom”). Early
natural law writers like Hugo Grotius and John Locke argued a testator had the right to
bequeath property to whomever he wished, subject to certain obligations to dependents. See
2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE:
THREE BOOKS] 265 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625); JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 65, at 36 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co.
1980) (1690) (“[A] father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, when his
children are out of danger of perishing for want . . . .”). But several natural law scholars,
including William Blackstone and Samuel Pufendorf, criticized using the natural law as the
basis for testamentary freedom. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10–11; 2
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO [ON THE LAW OF NATURE
AND OF NATIONS: EIGHT BOOKS] 615–20 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans.,
Clarendon Press 1934) (1688); see also BECKERT, supra note 39, at 51 (discussing
Pufendorf); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 7 (discussing Blackstone).
49. Halbach, supra note 6, at 5–6; Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified
Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 51 (1999); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 6–14. In
this Article, I adopt most of the assumptions of welfare economics, including the idea that
donors and donees are rational and forward looking and that interpersonal utility
comparisons are feasible. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 595–98. Welfare economics does
not exclude other considerations, such as the autonomy of the donor or fairness to the
donees, as long as these considerations are not given independent weight. For simplicity, I
bracket several questions in social choice theory about aggregating individual preferences
into a social welfare function. For early contributions to this literature, see generally
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); WILLIAM H.
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).
50. See Halbach, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing rationales for testamentary freedom);
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 6–14 (same).
51. Halbach, supra note 6, at 5; see also Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 8 (“Bracton’s
assumption—shared by modern social scientists—was that persons derive satisfaction out of
bequeathing property to others.”).
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Steven Shavell points out that “bequeathing property is simply one way
of using property.”52 Consequently, interfering with bequests “tends to
reduce individuals’ utility” because “a person will derive less utility from
property if he wants to bequeath it but is prevented from doing so.”53 To
the extent that a donor’s private interests may converge with what is
socially optimal, the donor will have an incentive to promote social welfare.
Second, testamentary freedom promotes capital accumulation. Shavell
notes that “a person will not work as hard to accumulate property if he
cannot then bequeath it as he pleases.”54 Likewise, other commentators
suggest that the freedom of testation may be an “incentive to industry and
saving,”55 “encouragement to industry and thrift,”56 and “incentive for
productive activities.”57 Thus, if a donor may dispose of property at death,
the donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest converges with the optimal
result. By contrast, if a donor prefers to give property to another but instead
decides to consume the property, a reduction in savings will affect not only
the donor’s utility but also society’s savings and its capital base. For this
reason, Gordon Tullock contends that the “principal” argument for
inheritance is “conservation of capital.”58
Third, compared to legislatures or courts, donors may possess better
information about the circumstances of family members and other donees.59
This informational advantage may allow donors to select the highest-valued
donee (e.g., a gifted or disabled child).60 By contrast, legislatures must rely
on general rules governing the succession of property (e.g., the first child
inherits everything or each child receives an equal share), which can be
overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. Typically, courts have neither the

52. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65.
53. Id.; see also Gordon Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465, 474 (1971)
(“Individuals before their death would be injured if they are prohibited from passing on their
estate to their heirs because it eliminates one possible alternative which they might otherwise
choose.”).
54. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65.
55. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 8.
56. Halbach, supra note 6, at 4.
57. Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64
TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1990); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and
Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U.
L.Q. 723, 735–63 (1986).
58. Tullock, supra note 53, at 465.
59. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 12 (arguing that testamentary freedom
“‘permits more intelligent estate planning,’ by allowing the testator to ‘take account of the
differing needs’ of members of her family” (quoting WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL.,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.8, at 88–89 (1988))). But cf. Stake, supra note 57, at 730
(arguing that “donations are not necessarily tailored to achieve an optimal distribution of
rights” because “the donor’s intended distribution will maximize the benefit to the donor’s
genes”).
60. See C.Y. Cyrus Chu, Primogeniture, 99 J. POLIT. ECON. 78, 79 (1991) (“Unequal
bequests may occur when parents intend to compensate a less able child or to reinforce the
advantage of one with greater ability.”); cf. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *12 (noting that
restrictions on freedom of disposition “prevented many provident fathers from dividing or
charging their estates as the exigence of their families required”).
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time nor the institutional capacity to investigate the circumstances of each
decedent to determine the optimal distribution.61
Fourth, freedom of testation may strengthen family relationships. Adam
Hirsch and William Wang argue that this freedom “supports . . . a market
for the provision of social services” and “encourages . . . beneficiaries to
provide . . . care and comfort—services that add to the total economic
‘pie.’”62 In addition, while altruism or love undoubtedly motivates many
gifts within families, there is also the possibility of “strategic bequests.”63
Some parents may use the threat of disinheritance to control the behavior of
their children, for example, by inducing their children to provide greater
care for them as they grow older.64 How often this threat of disinheritance
affects the parties’ incentives is an empirical question. While there is some
evidence to suggest that the threat of disinheritance may be relevant for
certain donors,65 there are also good reasons to be skeptical about this
rationale.66 Nevertheless, testamentary freedom may provide parents with
greater control over their children and encourage children to care for their
parents.
Overall, effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests is often consistent with
maximizing social welfare.67 The law usually facilitates donative intent, as
61. See Pierre Pestieau, Gifts, Wills and Inheritance Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
ECONOMICS 96, 100 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2011) (“This
relative superiority of the parents is often viewed as a key argument against any public
interference with private intergenerational transfers.”). But cf. Frances H. Foster, Towards a
Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
77, 124 (1998) (“China’s behavior-based model of inheritance presents . . . a workable
inheritance scheme of individualized justice that emphasizes judicial discretion rather than
fixed rules.”); Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 297 (1994) (“American inheritance law has been
relatively less concerned with ‘fair’ reallocation of property at death because of its embrace
of extensive freedom of testation and minimal forced heirship.”).
62. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 9–10; see also Gabrielle A. Brenner, Why Did
Inheritance Laws Change?, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 91 (1985).
63. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 1045 (1985); Tate, supra note 39.
64. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 63 (discussing the control of children via conditional
inheritance); see also Pestieau, supra note 61, at 109 (noting that several papers conclude
that “the only way to induce children to perform and not to shirk responsibility while waiting
for an inheritance is to allow their parents the possibility of disinheriting them”).
65. See Brenner, supra note 62, at 100 (discussing how preventing fathers from leaving
a will “started to work against fathers, who could no longer compel either support or
obedience from their children by the threat of disinheriting them”); Hirsch, supra note 29, at
2234 n.209 (citing other historical examples).
66. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 63 (“A problem with this argument . . . is that if
a parent desires attention, it is not obvious why the parent cannot ‘purchase’ it through gifts
during the parent’s lifetime (such as through large holiday presents or loans for the education
of grandchildren).”); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 11 (“[T]he strongest argument
against this rationale may be the practical observation that supplies of social services appear
generally to be inelastic; they are forthcoming, in poor families as in rich, more or less
irrespective of the suppliers’ inheritance prospects.”).
67. Maximizing social welfare is often the same as effectuating the donor’s interests, but
not always. For example, assume a dying mother will give $1,000 to her son and slightly
prefers that the son use the money to attend the opera rather than as he pleases. The son has
no interest in the opera and would obtain much greater utility if he can use the money to
AND
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expressed in a donative document like a will or trust, because it serves as a
useful approximation of a donor’s preferences.68 Just as the law views an
owner’s use of property as evidence of its highest-value use, the law
privileges donor intent as evidence of what maximizes the donor’s utility.
By aggregating each donor’s preferences and “protecting the donor’s right
to maximize her own utility, as reflected in her attempt to dispose of her
property by gift,”69 the law may increase social welfare if the interests of
donors generally converge with what is socially optimal.
Thus, whether testamentary freedom is consistent with maximizing social
welfare depends on whether donors act in ways that are consistent with
their own interests and the interest of donees. If “in most cases the public
interest and the donor’s intent are compatible,”70 then the objective of
promoting social welfare may justify adoption of testamentary freedom as
the organizing principle of succession law.71
C. Legal Restrictions on Testamentary Freedom
As discussed above, the organizing principle of American succession law
is testamentary freedom.72 Effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests is not
necessarily equivalent to maximizing social welfare. Accordingly, as the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers
points out, “American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent
that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is
prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of law.”73 But what types of
dispositions and purposes does the law prohibit or restrict?
The Restatement (Third) of Property provides a nonexhaustive list of
situations in which the law curtails testamentary freedom:
Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition in
certain instances are those relating to spousal rights; creditors’ rights;
purchase a big screen television. Here, requiring the son to attend the opera as a condition of
the gift might decrease social welfare, even though doing so might be consistent with the
donor’s intent.
68. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65; see also Terry W. Frasier, Protecting Ecological
Integrity Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 88 (1998) (“We
try to honor the donor’s intent, because the donor’s intent is the clue to what gave the donor
the greatest utility from disposing of her property.”).
69. Frasier, supra note 68, at 88.
70. Craig Kauffman, Sympathy for the Devil’s Advocate: Assisting the Attorney General
When Charitable Matters Reach the Courtroom, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 705, 707
(2006).
71. Whether testamentary freedom is the optimal system of allocating property at death
is beyond the scope of this Article. Elsewhere, I analyze the advantages and disadvantages
of testamentary freedom and compare it with alternative systems of succession, including
forced heirship, family maintenance, and redistribution. See Daniel B. Kelly, Allocating
Property at Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Succession Law (Nov. 4, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); cf. Halbach, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing
the possibility that inheritance is the “least objectionable arrangement for dealing with
property on the owner’s death”).
72. See supra Part I.A.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (2003) (emphasis added).
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unreasonable restraints on alienation or marriage; provisions promoting
separation or divorce; impermissible racial or other categoric restrictions;
provisions encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities
and accumulations.74

In each of these situations, there is, ostensibly, a countervailing policy for
not effectuating the donor’s ex ante wishes.75 Similarly, the UPC qualifies
the freedom of testation in several situations, including the elective share
for surviving spouses,76 rule against perpetuities,77 and rights of creditors.78
Just as a testator’s intent is the controlling consideration in interpreting a
will, the settlor’s intent is “paramount” in construing a trust.79 But, once
again, the law curtails a donor’s freedom of disposition because the settlor’s
intention must yield to countervailing policy considerations under certain
circumstances. For example, section 404 of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)
states: “A trust may be created only to the extent its purposes are lawful,
not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve. A trust and its terms
must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”80 This UTC provision imposes
two requirements on the settler.
First, a trust must be lawful, not contrary to public policy, and feasible.
These are longstanding limitations on the settlor’s testamentary freedom of
disposition. Historically, courts invalidated trust provisions that were
designed to evade taxes, violate banking laws, pay bribes, defraud creditors,
interfere with family relationships, encourage divorce, and restrict freedom
of religion.81 The UTC clarifies that a trust has an illegal purpose if “(1) its
performance involves the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the
trustee; (2) the settlor’s purpose in creating the trust was to defraud
creditors or others; or (3) the consideration for the creation of the trust was
illegal.”82 In addition, a trust violates “public policy” if it tends to
“encourage criminal or tortious conduct,” “interfere with freedom to marry
or encourage divorce,” “limit religious freedom,” or if its purpose is
“frivolous or capricious.”83
Second, under UTC section 404, “[a] trust and its terms must be for the
benefit of its beneficiaries.”84 The comments to the UTC state, “The
general purpose of trusts having identifiable beneficiaries is to benefit those
beneficiaries in accordance with their interests as defined in the trust’s

74. Id.
75. See infra Part IV.
76. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -207, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 101–21 (2010).
77. Id. §§ 2-901 to -902, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 465–66.
78. Id. §§ 3-801 to -816, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 208–66.
79. In re Lowy, 931 A.2d 552, 556 (N.H. 2007).
80. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404, 7C U.L.A. 484 (2010); see also Cooper, supra note 46, at
1171 (noting that exceptions to the rule privileging a settlor’s intent were “few and far
between, limited to cases where a trust provision encouraged illegal activity, fostered
immorality, or otherwise violated public policy”).
81. See Cooper, supra note 46, at 1171 nn.21–23.
82. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt., 7C U.L.A. at 484.
83. Id., 7C U.L.A. at 485.
84. Id. § 404, 7C U.L.A. at 484.
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terms.”85 In reflecting on several recent developments in trust law, Edward
Halbach points out that one theme is the “flexibility and efficiency in the
pursuit of the best interests of trust beneficiaries within the settlor’s legally
permissible objectives.”86 Notably, the UTC and Halbach both cabin the
benefit-of-the-beneficiaries principle within the principle that trustees must
act in accordance with the settlor’s instructions, a normative claim that
Robert Sitkoff defends in developing an agency costs theory of trust law.87
In addition, the idea that a trust must be for the benefit of beneficiaries
has been a key issue in recent law reform proposals. For example, in
advocating for more flexibility for trustees in performing their fiduciary
duties, John Langbein suggests replacing the trust rule requiring trustees to
act in the “sole interest” of beneficiaries with the standard for fiduciaries in
corporate law, which would require trustees to act in the “best interests” of
beneficiaries.88 Furthermore, while a trust must benefit the beneficiaries,
there is uncertainty about whether a settlor’s instructions can bind a trustee
to act in a way that may be contrary to the beneficiaries’ own interests.89
For example, if a trust contains a mandatory instruction to retain
undiversified assets,90 does a trustee have a duty to diversify, given that
diversification is seemingly in the best interests of the beneficiaries?91
Below, I assess the extent to which a number of legal restrictions on
testamentary freedom correspond with the economic justifications for
restricting the freedom of testation.92 Yet, before doing so, I examine why
the ex ante perspective is relevant in succession law in Part II, and analyze
the underlying justifications for restricting testamentary freedom in Part III.
II. RELEVANCE OF THE EX ANTE PERSPECTIVE
The distinction between ex ante and ex post analysis, though widely
utilized in other contexts, has received little attention in succession law. A
handful of scholars mention situations in which ex ante analysis might be

85. Id. § 404 cmt., 7C U.L.A. at 485.
86. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust
Law at Century’s End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2000).
87. See Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 683 (“[L]aw should minimize the agency costs
inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the
beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of
the settlor.” (emphasis added)).
88. See Langbein, supra note 11.
89. Compare Cooper, supra note 46, at 1170, with Langbein, supra note 18, at 1112.
90. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 643–46
(9th ed. 2013) (discussing permissive versus mandatory retention of inception assets and a
trustee’s duty to diversify).
91. In an influential article on mandatory rules in trust law, Langbein contends that “the
courts will come to view the advantages of diversification as so overwhelming that the
settlor’s interference with effective diversification will be treated as inconsistent with the
requirement that the trust terms must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.” Langbein, supra
note 18, at 1115 (“Settlor-directed underdiversification is an avoidable harm, akin to the
harm that the courts have prevented by intervening against settlors’ directions to waste or
destroy trust property.”).
92. See infra Part IV.
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pertinent for probate and trust law.93 But there is no systematic account of
why the ex ante/ex post distinction is significant or why these competing
modes of analysis are useful in evaluating the justifications for restricting
testamentary freedom. In this Part, I analyze the ex ante/ex post distinction,
illustrate its practical importance with an example from trust investment
law, and highlight several ex ante considerations that are often overlooked.
A. The Ex Ante/Ex Post Distinction
The ex ante/ex post distinction is an important concept in evaluating
human behavior and the consequences of actions.94 The distinction, coined
by Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist and sociologist, is used widely in
macroeconomics “to distinguish what is planned (i.e., ex ante) from what
actually happens (i.e., ex post).”95 The distinction is also fundamental in
analyzing legal rules and institutions.96 Legal theorist Lawrence Solum has
stated, “If I had to select only one theoretical tool for a first-year law
student to master, it would be the ex post/ex ante distinction.”97
Why is the ex ante/ex post distinction relevant? Ex post analysis looks at
an event or dispute after the fact.98 Solum explains it this way: “The ex
post perspective is backward looking. From the ex post point of view, we
ask questions like: Who acted badly and who acted well? Whose rights
were violated?”99 By contrast, ex ante analysis looks at an event or dispute
before the fact. We might ask: “What [e]ffect will this rule have on the
future? Will deci[ding] . . . a case in this way produce good or bad
consequences?”100 Thus, “[e]x post analysis tends to focus on fairness and
distributional concerns, whereas ex ante analysis is more likely to consider
incentives for future conduct.”101
93. See infra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.
94. In a recent article, I argue that a number of insights from economics and economic
analysis of law, including the ex ante/ex post distinction, are useful in analyzing succession
law. See Kelly, supra note 29, at 867–71. This section expands on that earlier analysis of the
ex ante perspective.
95. DONALD RUTHERFORD, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 210 (2d ed. 2002)
(ex ante, ex post entry).
96. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY S. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
60 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that “[e]conomists often speak of ‘ex ante’ analysis and ‘ex post’
analysis” and pointing out that “this locution has been picked up by courts in recent years”).
97. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 001: Ex Ante & Ex Post, LEGAL THEORY
LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/09/legal_theory_le_2.html
(last updated Feb. 17, 2013); see also Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy:
Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 70 (1995) (“The policy analyst
must always bear in mind that legal rules have ex ante consequences: they affect the world
both after and before the fact.” (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10–12, 19–33 (1984))).
98. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 60; see also Kelly, supra note 29, at 867 (noting
that the ex post view “attempts to arrive at an outcome or disposition which seeks to promote
fairness, vindicate rights, or maximize social welfare based on prior events”).
99. Solum, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 64; see also Kelly, supra note 29, at 868 (noting
that the ex ante perspective “recognizes that the selection of a legal rule can often have an
effect on a party’s incentives”).
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Most economically oriented legal scholars conclude that the ex ante
perspective is a superior mode of legal and policy analysis. Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell contend that “relying on an ex post view, when it differs
from the ex ante perspective, always entails favoring a legal policy under
which everyone is worse off ex ante.”102 That is, if policy A is socially
optimal ex ante, and policy B is socially optimal ex post, moving from A to
B is undesirable (and makes everyone worse off); conversely, moving from
B to A is socially desirable (and makes everyone better off). The ex ante
view has at least two distinct advantages.
First, ex ante analysis incorporates the idea that “the choice of legal rules
may affect how individuals behave at the outset, which often has an
important influence on individuals’ well-being.”103 The claim is not that
law will always affect the actions of the parties. In certain circumstances,
parties may take the same actions, irrespective of the applicable legal rule,
due to underlying social norms or moral considerations.104 Rather, the
claim is that, in many situations, parties may change their behavior based
on the law. Consider, for example, the time and money many individuals
spend consulting lawyers and financial advisors to update their estate plans
in response to changes in the tax code.105 By contrast, “when one adopts an
ex post perspective, one often ignores important effects of legal rules.”106
Second, ex ante analysis avoids the possibility of “hindsight bias.”107
Hindsight
bias,
known
colloquially
as
“Monday
morning

102. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 439 (2002); see
also POSNER, supra note 19, at 9 (“This discussion of sunk costs should help explain the
emphasis that economists place on the ex ante (before the fact) rather than ex post (after the
fact) perspective.”). Maximizing social welfare requires an ex ante view (which implicitly
incorporates ex post considerations).
103. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1158,
1356 (2001).
104. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 52–53 (1991) (finding that, in cattle disputes in Shasta County, California,
allegiance to an “overarching norm of cooperation” is “wholly independent of formal legal
entitlements”).
105. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift
Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 902 (2010); Carolyn Burgess Featheringill, Estate Tax
Apportionment and Nonprobate Assets: Picking the Right Pocket, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 42
(1990).
106. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 1356. The point is not only that law may
affect how individuals behave but that changes in how parties behave may affect their wellbeing. If a change in the tax code causes a client to adopt Estate Planning Strategy 2, rather
than Estate Planning Strategy 1, it is not simply a matter of a client telling her attorney to
draft a different provision in her will. Instead, all else equal, without the legal change, the
donor may prefer Estate Planning Strategy 1. If a client adopts Estate Planning Strategy 2
because of some exogenous legal change, then switching from Strategy 1 to Strategy 2
reduces the client’s satisfaction. Thus, the substantive content of legal rules may alter how
individuals act at the outset, which in turn may affect their happiness.
107. On hindsight bias, see, for example, Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The
Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975), and Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89
(1995).
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quarterbacking,”108 is a tendency of humans to “overestimate the
predictability of past events—both overstating their ability to have
predicted past events and believing others should have been able to predict
these events.”109 Ex ante analysis attempts to avoid hindsight bias by
considering “all possible outcomes an individual might experience” rather
than merely a salient, perhaps atypical, outcome that happens to occur.110
As Kaplow and Shavell emphasize, comprehensively evaluating a legal rule
“requires considering all possible outcomes an individual might experience,
not just a particular one that may involve bad luck.”111 Thus, a proper
evaluation of a legal rule—that is, an evaluation that incorporates ex ante
considerations, not just ex post concerns—“weights all possibilities by their
probabilities precisely to avoid granting excessive weight to a particular
subset of outcomes.”112
B. Example: Hindsight Bias in Trust Investment Law
To illustrate, consider a trustee’s fiduciary duty in trust investment law.
A trustee owes a duty of prudence to the beneficiaries of a trust. Under this
duty, trustees must act consistent with an objective standard of care.113
Today, the primary application of this duty is in trust investment law: the
trustee must invest assets with prudence. Over time the rule governing this
duty has shifted from the “prudent man rule” to a “prudent investor rule.”114
One problem with the prudent man rule was that courts allowed hindsight
bias to affect their evaluation of a trustee’s performance.
Prior to the prudent man rule, most jurisdictions relied on “legal list”
statutes.115 These statutes restricted trustees to choosing certain “safe”
investments like bonds and first mortgages.116 Eventually, to replace such
statutes and give trustees more flexibility, most states adopted the prudent
man rule.117 Under this rule, the trustee was “to make such investments and
only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property
having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity
of the income to be derived.”118
108. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1457 (Philip Babcock Gove
ed., 1993) (defining a “Monday morning quarterback” as “a person who using hindsight
criticizes what others have done”).
109. Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L.
REV. 237, 253 (2008).
110. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 1356.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804, 7C U.L.A. 601 (2010) (“A trustee shall administer the
trust as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee
shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 17 introductory note (2007).
115. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment
Law (pt. 1), 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3–4.
116. Id. at 4.
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 17 introductory note.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
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But a major problem with the prudent man rule was hindsight bias. In
applying the rule, courts often exhibited hindsight bias in evaluating the
outcome of specific investments.119 If a trustee selected a higher risk
investment (e.g., securities), and the investment did not pay off, the trustee
faced liability for “speculating” in the stock, even if the investment was a
reasonable one at the time it was made. Thus, due to hindsight bias, courts
had a proclivity to focus on the actual performance of an investment,
without considering the likelihood of all possible outcomes.
A classic example of hindsight bias is In re Chamberlain’s Estate.120
The case involved trust investments made in August 1929, three months
before the stock market crash in October 1929. In ruling against the
trustees for failing to sell more quickly, the court opined: “It was common
knowledge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies, but the general
public as well, that the stock market condition [in August 1929] was an
unhealthy one, that values were very much inflated, and that a crash was
almost sure to occur.”121 If it was in fact “common knowledge” that values
were inflated, investors would have started to sell then, not three months
later.122 From the court’s perspective (after the fact), the stock market crash
was inevitable. Yet, from an investor’s perspective (before the fact), the ex
ante probability of a crash may have been relatively small. Thus, a decision
not to sell in August 1929 was not necessarily an unreasonable one.
Social scientists have noted a proclivity among courts to exhibit
hindsight bias in many situations, including the evaluation of investment
decisions by trustees. For example, in analyzing the heuristics and biases of
courts, Jeffrey Rachlinksi notes that “courts judging the liability of trustees
have not cleverly adapted to the hindsight bias, but have fallen prey to its
influence.”123 According to Rachlinski:
As a consequence of their reliance on hindsight, courts continuously
declared investments of certain types to be speculative. Because of the
hindsight bias, any investment with the potential to lose money could
have given rise to liability; the riskier the investment, the more likely that
it would result in liability. Consequently, the prudent-[man] rule evolved
from a flexible standard of liability into a source of constraints on trustees
developed by adjudication in hindsight.124

In testing whether hindsight bias affects judges, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey
Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich find that “judges exhibited a predictable
hindsight bias.”125 If judges “learned that a particular outcome had
occurred, they were much more likely to identify that outcome as the most
119. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 619 (noting the “prevalence of
hindsight bias in its application by courts”).
120. 156 A. 42, 43 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931).
121. Id. at 43.
122. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 619.
123. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 79 (2000).
124. Id. at 80.
125. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 803 (2001).
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likely to have occurred.”126 In addition, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich
note several cases, including Chamberlain, in which trustees became
“victims of the hindsight bias.”127
Not all courts succumb to judging by hindsight.128 For example, in
Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co.,129 a case decided over seventy years
ago, an Indiana intermediate appellate court emphasized that judges should
evaluate a trustee’s exercise of due care “in the light of circumstances
existing at the time the action was taken, and not in the light of subsequent
events which could not be reasonably anticipated.”130 The court pointed
out that judging the trustee’s actions in hindsight could have perverse
consequences: “For a trustee’s actions to be judged in the light of hindsight
would discourage prudent men from undertaking any trust.”131
The problem with judging the trustees’ investments with the benefit of
hindsight is not only the erroneous decisions themselves. Rather, these
erroneous decisions can affect the parties’ incentives at the outset.
Knowing they could be liable for “imprudent” investments, trustees learned
not to engage in “risky” investments; instead, many trustees adopted
investment strategies that were overly cautious relative to each
beneficiary’s risk profile.132 As a result, because investment strategies were
too conservative, the prudent man rule actually harmed the beneficiaries.
Even though a particular beneficiary may have succeeded in arguing that a
trustee violated the duty of prudence because an investment turned out
poorly in hindsight, the fact that trustees would have an incentive to choose
investments with little risk meant smaller returns for future beneficiaries.
Put another way, beneficiaries may have wanted the courts to evaluate
investments with the benefit of hindsight after the fact, but these same
beneficiaries would not want courts to judge by hindsight before the fact.
Doing so would distort the incentives of the trustees and reduce the wealth
of the beneficiaries. Despite the problem of hindsight bias and several other
flaws, the prudent man rule persisted.133
Eventually, due to the influence of several articles by John Langbein and
Judge Richard Posner,134 trust investment law began to recognize the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 804 (citing First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428
(Ala. 1982); Chase v. Peaver, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Mass. 1981); In re Chamberlain’s
Estate, 156 A. 42, 42–43 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931)).
128. A number of courts avoided hindsight bias in concluding that a trustee’s actions
should be evaluated at the time of a trustee’s decision. See, e.g., Dennis v. R.I. Hosp. Trust
Nat’l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1983); In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y.
1997).
129. 48 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. App. 1943).
130. Id. at 190.
131. Id.
132. See Rachlinski, supra note 123, at 81 (“[T]hese courts easily lapsed into the
language of judging in hindsight, thereby driving other trustees into overly cautious
investment strategies.”).
133. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987).
134. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 115; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner,
Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; John H.
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problem of hindsight bias and incorporate insights from modern portfolio
theory.135 Accordingly, courts started to abandon the prudent man rule and
adopt a new approach: the prudent investor rule.136 The prudent investor
rule explicitly warns against the dangers of hindsight bias. Specifically, the
rule recognizes that the determination of whether a trustee has breached a
duty of prudence depends on whether a trustee acts consistently with the
duty ex ante, not whether the investments turned out poorly ex post.137
The prudent investor rule not only assists courts in deciding cases
correctly but also helps ensure that a trustee’s incentive to invest converges
with the investments that would be in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
Hence, reducing hindsight bias in judicial decisionmaking is beneficial for
beneficiaries ex ante, even though particular beneficiaries will no longer be
able to assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty in cases in which the
trustee’s investments turn out poorly ex post. To be sure, even under a
prudent investor rule, some courts may continue to exhibit hindsight bias.138
But the law’s evolution from the prudent man rule to a prudent investor rule
illustrates the importance of the ex ante perspective.
C. Incorporating Ex Ante Considerations
In many areas of the law, legal policy can diverge from the socially
optimal result because a legislature or court adopts an ex post perspective
and ignores ex ante considerations. The law of succession is no exception.
A handful of legal scholars, including Adam Hirsch,139 John Langbein,140
Langbein & Richard A. Posner, The Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A. J. 764
(1976).
135. See HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS (1959); Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); see also
Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Modern Portfolio Theory, 1950 to Date, 21 J. BANKING
& FIN. 1743 (1997) (surveying the literature and history).
136. See, e.g., Nelson v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Williston, 543 F.3d 432, 434–36
(8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the trustee conformed with the prudent investor rule); In re
Estate of Cooper, 913 P.2d 393, 395 (Wash. App. 1996) (“We hold the prudent investor rule
focuses on the performance of the trustee, not the results of the trust.”).
137. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 8, 7B U.L.A. 38 (2006) (“Compliance with the
prudent investor rule is determined in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time
of a trustee’s decision or action and not by hindsight.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 90 cmt. b (2007) (“[C]ompliance with these fiduciary standards is to be judged as of the
time the investment decision in question was made, not with the benefit of hindsight or by
taking account of developments that occurred after the time of a decision to make, retain, or
sell an investment.”).
138. See Guthrie et al., supra note 125, at 821 (“[J]udges applying the prudent-investor
rule to cases of trustee liability seem also to have fallen prey to the hindsight bias.”).
139. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 49, at 70–71, 82 (spendthrift trusts); Adam J. Hirsch,
Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2695–96 (2006) (asset
protection trusts); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057,
1066, 1123, 1127 n.213 (1996) (executing, reforming, updating wills); Adam J. Hirsch,
Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 109, 146 (2001) (disclaimer); Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of
Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 615, 626 (2009) (capacity and
impossibility).
140. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 11, at 937, 972 (duty of loyalty).
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Robert Sitkoff,141 and Stewart Sterk,142 mention situations in which ex ante
analysis is relevant in probate or trust law.143 Moreover, as discussed,
Langbein and Posner helped to revolutionize trust investment law by
emphasizing hindsight bias and other flaws with the prudent man rule.144
But there are few attempts to analyze ex ante considerations in succession
law more systematically.
This Article discusses a number of ex ante considerations that are
relevant in succession law, including (1) the donor’s happiness; (2) the
donor’s incentive to accumulate property; (3) the structure and timing of
gifts; and (4) other ex ante considerations. These ex ante considerations,
while often overlooked, are critical in accurately evaluating the normative
justifications for restricting testamentary freedom.145
1. Donor’s Happiness
A legal rule or judicial decision that interferes with a donor’s disposition
after death may affect the donor’s happiness during life. Of course, after
death, a donor does not suffer disutility. Thus, ex post, a legislature or
court may ignore the effect of a rule or decision on the donor. However,
overlooking the donor’s happiness during life may result in adopting a legal
rule that is socially undesirable.
The ex ante perspective incorporates the satisfaction of a donor—even if
a donor is dead—not just the interests of the donees. Courts have long
recognized the importance of the donor’s happiness. For example, seventyfive years ago, the D.C. Circuit announced:
Perhaps the wishes of the dead should not concern the living, but our legal
system is built on a different theory. Many living persons derive
satisfaction from the thought that they can control the devolution of their
property. In distributing decedents’ estates the law undertakes, within
141. See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 657–71 (trust modification and termination,
trustee removal, settlor standing, trust protectors); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate
Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 577–78 (2003) (trust management).
142. Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent
Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 889–91 (2010) (prudent investment).
143. For other examples, see David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1700–01 (2009) (testamentary freedom and unconscionability),
and Peter T. Wendell, The Evolution of the Law of Trustee’s Powers and Third Party
Liability for Participating in a Breach of Trust: An Economic Analysis, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 971, 1010–12 (2005) (duties of a trustee and liability of third parties).
144. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
145. Many ex ante considerations (e.g., the donor’s happiness and donor’s incentives) are
relevant for evaluating restrictions on testamentary freedom only if the donor knows about
the restriction. For purposes of this analysis, I assume that donors are aware of the law.
This assumption is likely warranted for most donors, given the role of the estate planning
attorney. If the donor (or the donor’s attorney) was somehow unaware of the restriction or
the risk of legal intervention (e.g., suppose that courts did not publish prior decisions
restricting testamentary freedom), then it may be possible for the law to maximize the
donees’ interests ex post while not affecting the donor’s utility or incentives ex ante,
although this scenario is unlikely except in unusual circumstances. Cf. Stake, supra note 57,
at 757 (discussing how the rule against perpetuities, due to its complexity, might avoid the
conflict between generations because of a donor’s “beneficial misapprehension” of the rule).
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limits, to follow the wishes of the former owners as manifested by will or
intestacy.146

Indeed, one of the primary justifications for testamentary freedom is that
“owners gain personal satisfaction from bequeathing property.”147
Modern scholars in law and economics, as well as trusts and estates,
agree that a donor’s satisfaction is relevant. As noted above, in analyzing
whether society should intervene in private decisions to bequeath property,
Shavell notes that interfering with bequests “tends to reduce individuals’
utility directly.”148 That is, “a person will derive less utility from property
if he wants to bequeath it but is prevented from doing so.”149 Likewise, in
discussing arguments for dead hand control, Shavell points out that
controlling property after death is simply “a way of using property.”150
Consequently, “a benchmark for thought is that society should not interfere
with parties’ desires to control property long after their deaths.”151
Similarly, a number of economically oriented scholars in wills, trusts, and
estates have highlighted the importance of donor satisfaction, as well.152
A donor may derive happiness from giving because of self-interest or
altruism. If the happiness is related to mere self-interest, a donor obtains
satisfaction from the act of giving itself. James Andreoni describes this as
“warm-glow giving” because the donor experiences a warm glow simply by
making the gift.153 The distinguishing characteristic of this type of selfinterested giving is that the act of giving “may supply utility to the donor,
independently of the degree of satisfaction it renders the donee.”154 Other
types of self-interested giving may be based on exchange or reciprocity.155
A gift also may increase the donor’s happiness due to altruism.156 If a
donor is altruistic, the donor’s utility is a function of the donees’ utility, i.e.,

146. Webb v. Lohnes, 96 F.2d 582, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
147. Hirsch, supra note 49, at 51; see also supra Part I.B.
148. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 68.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 6, at 5 (“[I]t is a great comfort and satisfaction to
know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can be provided for and
may be able to enjoy better lives because of the inheritance that can be left to them.”); Hirsch
& Wang, supra note 28, at 8 (“To the extent that lawmakers deny persons the opportunity to
bequeath freely, the subjective value of property will drop, for one of its potential uses will
have disappeared.”).
153. James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464–77 (1990).
154. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 58.
155. See Erik Schokkaert, The Empirical Analysis of Transfer Motives, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM, AND RECIPROCITY 127, 132–33, 166–68 (SergeChristophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006) (discussing reciprocity as a motivation
for giving and comparing altruism with exchange or reciprocity).
156. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 19, at 688 (noting that one “explanation for bequests is
the motive of altruism”). For an extended discussion of altruism in intergenerational
transfers, see Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distributive and
Welfare Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641 (1999).
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the preferences of the donor incorporate the well-being of donees.157 For
example, parents may pay college tuition for a child because the parents’
happiness depends on the child’s happiness.158 A grantor may execute a
discretionary support trust to benefit a spouse because the grantor takes
comfort knowing the spouse will have financial support after the grantor’s
death. A philanthropist may donate money to charity because she believes
that advancing science, relieving poverty, or promoting public health will
improve the welfare of others.
By contrast, the ex post perspective may ignore the donor’s utility. If a
donor is dead, a court may elevate the interests of donees, even if doing so
harms the donor. Some courts and commentators may overlook the fact
that disregarding a donor’s intent after death may decrease the donor’s
happiness during life. One scholar characterizes the ex post view in this
way: “Protecting the intent of a deceased testator over the interest of living
individuals rarely fares well when viewed from an ex post perspective.”159
He asks, “What sense does it make for society to allow the wishes of the
deceased to trump the happiness of the living?”160 Another scholar puts it
more bluntly: “I can’t believe that reverence for some dead guy’s intent is
going to determine major outcomes.”161
Adopting an ex post view that privileges the interests of donees over the
wishes of donors is often based on an erroneous assumption. Specifically,
this view assumes that restricting a donor’s ability to transfer property at
death will not affect a donor’s utility during life. But such an assumption is
warranted only if living donors continue to believe the law will effectuate
their intent, even though courts regularly disregard the intent of similarly
situated donors.162 Shavell notes that “individuals who desire dead hand
control will in fact suffer utility losses when they are alive, assuming that
they anticipate that property will not be used in the way they want when
they are dead.”163 Thus, courts will reach the correct result only if the law
157. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 58 (observing that a “major motivation” for gift
giving is “pure altruism” in which a “donor cares about the well-being of the donee” and
“obtains utility from the utility of the donee”); see also Steven Shavell, An Economic
Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 402 (1991) (employing a
model in which “the donor’s utility includes a component equal to the donee’s utility
multiplied by a parameter called the donor’s degree of altruism,” and so “the donor’s utility
will be higher the greater his degree of altruism or the larger the donee’s utility”).
158. Cf. Chu, supra note 60, at 93 (“The model of altruism toward children usually
assumes that the family head intends to maximize a dynastic utility function.”).
159. Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule
Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 288 (2010).
160. Id.
161. Dobris, supra note 13, at 2548–49.
162. Cf. Stake, supra note 57, at 757.
163. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68; cf. Paul H. Brietzke, New Wrinkles in Law . . . and
Economics, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 105, 121 n.42 (1997) (noting that, even though “Coasian
bargains are impossible because the grantor is dead . . . the common law continues to respect
the grantor’s interests because . . . of the putative ex ante efficiency of allowing her to rule
from beyond the grave” (citing UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 174
(1997))); J.D. Trout & Shahid A. Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”: Inheritance,
Redistribution, and the Science of Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765, 789–90 (2000) (arguing
that one who is dead cannot have desires but acknowledging that “what will happen after one
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views the problem ex ante and incorporates the donor’s happiness during
life.164
2. Donor’s Incentive To Accumulate Property
A legal rule or decision that alters a donor’s disposition after death also
may affect the donor’s incentive to accumulate property during life. For
example, if a donor believes a court will not effectuate her intent, then the
donor may have less incentive to work, less incentive to save and invest,
and a greater incentive to consume property. The ex ante view incorporates
the fact that the choice of legal rules may affect the incentive to accumulate
property, including a donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest.165 By
contrast, an ex post view may ignore that the choice of rules affects a
donor’s incentive to accumulate property. By ignoring such considerations,
courts may distort behavior in several ways that are undesirable.
If a donor anticipates a restriction on testamentary freedom, the donor
may have an incentive to work less during life. Bequeathing property is
one way of using property, so altering gifts may lower the incentive to
work: “[A] person will not work as hard to accumulate property if he
cannot then bequeath it as he pleases.”166 This distortion in the incentive to
work has social implications as well because “thwarted testators will choose
to accumulate less property, and the total stock of wealth existing at any
given time will shrink.”167 Thus, legal intervention in the decision to
bequeath property may reduce the incentive of donors to work.
Likewise, if a testator thinks a court may disregard donative intent, the
testator may save less and consume more. If a legal rule makes bequeathing
is dead is relevant to one’s level of welfare” because, “[f]or example, one might be
concerned that, without an inheritance, one’s offspring would be left vulnerable, and this
worry about the future of one’s offspring may erode one’s happiness”).
164. To illustrate, consider an example. Suppose D gives $100,000 to C in a testamentary
trust for C’s college expenses. During life, the marginal utility to D of knowing that C will
be able to access the money for college (rather than for some other purpose) is $30,000.
After D dies, C attempts to terminate the trust. Assume that the value to C of using the
money for college is $90,000, but the value to C of using the money to enter a poker
competition is $110,000. From an ex post view, a court should terminate the trust because
the value to C of owning the property outright ($110,000) exceeds the value to C of owning
the property in trust ($90,000), and D is dead. However, from an ex ante view, a court
should effectuate D’s intent because ex ante analysis incorporates D’s utility during life, in
addition to C’s utility. Here, the value to D and C of not terminating the trust ($30,000 +
$90,000 = $120,000) exceeds the value to D and C of terminating the trust ($0 + $110,000 =
$110,000). As noted above, effectuating a donor’s interests is not always equivalent to
maximizing social welfare, because an increase in the donee’s utility ex post might outweigh
any decrease in the donor’s utility ex ante (assuming there are no other ex ante
consequences). See supra note 67.
165. The incentive to accumulate property is related to a donor’s satisfaction during life.
Hirsch points out that, because “testamentary freedom adds to the utility owners derive from
what they acquire,” effectuating the wishes of donors “enhances their incentive both to
produce and to save wealth.” Hirsch, supra note 49, at 51.
166. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65.
167. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 8. The existence and magnitude of this effect on
the donor’s incentive to accumulate property are empirical questions, although there is little
empirical research on such questions except in the context of estate taxation.
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property less attractive relative to consuming property, the testator may
have an incentive to save less.168 If so, the testator may have less property
in her estate to transfer to donees at death. The idea applies not only to
wills but also to trusts: “Individuals who know that their intent cannot be
carried out in a trust may behave differently: they may choose to spend
money during their lifetime that they might have left for their descendants
in a trust.”169 Thus, restrictions on testamentary freedom may result in
excessive consumption relative to savings.
At first glance, this result may seem to benefit the donor—after all, the
donor now consumes more during life. But consuming more and giving
less actually reduces a donor’s utility. All other things being equal, the
donor would prefer giving the property to others rather than consuming it.
In the absence of a legal limitation or judicial intervention, the donor would
have saved and donated the property, rather than consuming it, consistent
with the donor’s preferences. In addition, if a donor consumes more and
saves less, this additional consumption is detrimental to donees. Because
the donor will save less, the donor will have less property to transmit to
donees at the time of the donor’s death. Thus, from a social perspective, the
excessive consumption is undesirable because it harms the donor and the
donees and reduces the overall savings rate.170
One objection is whether individuals will in fact work less or save less if
they anticipate being unable to bequeath property.171 Even assuming
restrictions on testamentary freedom have little or no impact on most
people’s incentive to work, they may affect certain types of donors.
Suppose a donor has enough money to satisfy his own needs, wants, and
desires, as well as those of his children, and plans to give future earnings to
charity or his grandchildren. This donor might prefer to work as a CEO for
several more years, not only because his wisdom and experience are useful
to the company but also so that he can support his favorite charities and
help provide for his grandchildren’s future. Alternatively, the donor could
retire to Arizona or Florida. Assuming he is still a productive executive,

168. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 19, at 688 (“[H]eavy estate taxation, by raising the
price of posthumous consumption relative to present consumption, will reduce the incentive
to save and increase the incentive to consume.”); cf. Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love:
Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 479 (2006)
(“[W]hen the law imposes a mandatory rule with respect to trusts, it may have an impact on
what potential settlors do with their money.”).
169. Tate, supra note 168, at 479. Again, the existence and magnitude of this effect are
empirical questions.
170. See Halbach, supra note 6, at 6.
171. Does limiting freedom of disposition have any marginal effect on an individual’s
decision to work, in terms of the number of years, the number of hours per week, or the
types of employment opportunities they pursue? Or will donors work the same regardless of
the laws governing succession? Similarly, does limiting freedom of disposition have any
effect on an individual’s decision to save rather than consume? For an analysis of wealth
transfer taxation that cites to a number of early empirical studies related to this issue, see
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283,
318–21 (1994).
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reducing the CEO’s incentive to continue working would be socially
undesirable.172
Another objection is that even if a rule decreases a donor’s incentive to
work (suppose the CEO retires three years early), any loss of productivity
may be offset by an increase in the donees’ incentives to work (the CEO’s
grandchildren will have to study and work harder). In discussing estate
taxation, Judge Richard Posner argues that, for this reason, “aggregate
effects of heavy estate taxation on work, saving, and consumption are
probably slight.”173 Posner asserts that “the diminished incentive of heavily
taxed potential testators to work hard may be offset by the increased
incentive of their potential heirs to work hard.”174
The net effect of restricting testamentary freedom on the donor’s and
donees’ incentive to work is ultimately an empirical question. Andrew
Carnegie famously suggested that “the parent who leaves his son enormous
wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts
him to lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would.”175
In an empirical study testing Carnegie’s conjecture, Douglas Hotz-Easkin,
David Joulfaian, and Harvey Rosen found that sizable inheritances do
decrease a person’s participation in the labor force.176 However, there is
relatively little evidence comparing the relative magnitude of the effect on
donees with the effect on donors.
Posner and Carnegie are correct that, theoretically, a bequest may affect a
donee’s incentives in socially undesirable ways. On the other hand, there
are several reasons why the effect on donor behavior may still be relevant,
and why this effect may outweigh any adverse effects on donees. First, the
social loss from a decline in the donor’s labor may exceed the social loss
from any decline in the donees’ labor. Second, given the diminishing
marginal utility of wealth, the same property may result in more happiness
in the hands of the donees than in the hands of the donor, if the donor’s
wealth exceeds the wealth of individual donees. Third, a gift may have
little or no effect on the incentive of donees to work if the donor gives the
property to a charity rather than individuals (grandchildren).177 Fourth, like
172. If a worker is not a productive member of the labor force, then providing incentives
for the worker to retire may increase productivity. See Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, A Positive
Theory of Social Security, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 277, 277 (1996) (suggesting that “pensions
are a means to induce retirement—that is, to buy the elderly out of the labor force because
aggregate output is higher if the elderly do not work”).
173. POSNER, supra note 19, at 689.
174. Id.
175. Andrew Carnegie, The Advantages of Poverty, in THE “GOSPEL OF WEALTH” ESSAYS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 31, 38 (David Nasaw ed., Penguin Grp. 2006) (1891).
176. See Douglas Hotz-Easkin, David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, The Carnegie
Conjecture: Some Empirical Evidence, 108 Q.J. ECON. 413, 432 (1993) (“[F]amilies with
one or two earners who received inheritances above $150,000 were about three times more
likely to reduce their labor force participation to zero than families with inheritances below
$25,000.”).
177. The gift may affect the incentives of the charity in other ways, for example, reducing
the need for the charity to raise funds. Conversely, if a restriction on testamentary freedom
causes the donor to switch from a charitable beneficiary to an individual donee, then the
restriction may have negative effects on the incentives of both the donor and donee.
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Carnegie, many affluent donors are aware of this problem and take
measures, including the use of incentive trusts, to mitigate any adverse
effect on donees.178
Overall, ignoring the effect of limitations on testamentary freedom on the
donor’s incentive to save and invest would be similar to ignoring the impact
of an estate tax on the incentive to save and consume.179 To be sure, the
magnitude of this effect is difficult to estimate empirically, and the effect
may be offset to a certain extent by a greater incentive for future
generations to accumulate wealth.180 However, the effect on the donor’s
incentive to save and invest should be a relevant consideration.
3. Structure and Timing of the Donor’s Gifts
In addition to affecting the donor’s happiness and incentive to save and
invest, the applicable legal rule might alter the donor’s ex ante behavior by
affecting the structure and timing of gifts. Specifically, the choice of rule
may affect the timing of a gift, the identity of donees, and the size of a gift,
including whether or not the donor decides to give a gift at all.
First, ex ante analysis recognizes that the law may affect the timing of a
gift. A donor may transfer property during life (“inter vivos” gifts), at death
(“testamentary” gifts), or even after death (gifts made in trust). Because the
“legal policies controlling inheritance can be partially circumvented by
increases in inter vivos gifts,” individuals may opt to transfer property
during life rather than at death.181 For example, shortly after enacting the
estate tax, Congress had to enact a gift tax to prevent donors from
circumventing the estate tax by giving away their property during life. As a
result, it may be difficult and costly to curtail gratuitous transfers at
death.182 In addition, inter vivos transfers can be socially suboptimal
because of what Hendrik Hartog has called the “King Lear” problem—“the
problem of not giving up control and power and property too early.”183
178. See, e.g., Richard I. Kirkland, Jr., Should You Leave It All to the Children?,
FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18 (interviewing Warren Buffett, who stated that “the perfect
amount to leave to children is ‘enough money so that they would feel they could do
anything, but not so much that they could do nothing’”); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 90, at 9–10 (pointing out that settlors often rely on “incentive trusts” to ensure a
“beneficiary does not adopt a slothful or frivolous lifestyle”).
179. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 688 (“[H]eavy estate taxation, by raising the price of
posthumous consumption relative to present consumption, will reduce the incentive to save
and increase the incentive to consume.”); see also McCaffery, supra note 171, at 318–21.
180. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
181. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 66; see also Hirsch, supra note 49, at 51 (“[D]enying
freedom of testation in the statute books would not curtail it in action (absent very costly
policing), for testators could avail themselves of roundabout, or if need be surreptitious,
expedients to reach the same result.”).
182. See WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE 718–19 (Isaac
Kramnick ed., Penguin 1985) (1793); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 11.
183. HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE
AND OLD AGE 33 (2012) (emphasis added). Near the beginning of King Lear, Lear foolishly
disposes of his estate by giving away property to two of his three daughters, even though he
is still alive. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1.
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Second, the ex ante perspective recognizes that the law may affect the
identity of donees. If a donor believes that a court is unlikely to effectuate
gifts to certain donees or certain types of donees,184 the donor may choose
to give her property to others at the outset. Suppose a donor executes a will
that contains a conditional bequest to a child and a gift over to a charity. If
the donor anticipates a court will not enforce the condition in the bequest,
the donor may just provide an outright gift to the charity, eliminating any
possibility of the child’s satisfying the condition and receiving the bequest.
Likewise, a donor may alter the size of a gift. Suppose a donor wishes to
give a charity $2 million from her estate, but the donor believes a court will
allow the charity to allege “changed circumstances” too easily and alter the
distributional provisions through cy pres. Anticipating this possibility, the
donor may give the charity only $500,000, rather than $2 million, from her
estate. Once again, a donor may alter her behavior or the size of her gifts
not only in wills but also in trusts: “Individuals who know that their intent
cannot be carried out in a trust may behave differently” because “they may
choose to alter the plan of their trust and leave their property to different
individuals or entities or to vary the amount left to each beneficiary.”185
Third, the ex ante view recognizes that, in response to a restriction on
testamentary freedom, a donor may limit gratuitous transfers at death or
forgo such gifts entirely. Posner mentions the possibility that “in the long
term, as testators ‘wise up’ to the courts’ policy of refusing to enforce
conditions that the judges deem unreasonable, they will curtail bequests.”186
Similarly, Hirsch notes that allowing trustees “to deviate at their discretion
from any charitable purpose immediately upon creation of the trust” could
“prompt the testator ex ante to refrain from making charitable bequests.”187
Thus, if the law disregards donative intent, donors may alter their behavior
and choose to curtail bequests or forgo giving altogether.
Historically, in attempting to dismiss this possibility, some jurists have
argued that even if courts interfere with the freedom of testation and
disregard donative intent, donors will continue to give and will give in the
same way. In The Dead Hand, Arthur Hobhouse concludes: “Another plea
for non-interference is that many people will cease to give if they see the
gifts of others freely remodelled.”188 Hobhouse opines: “This plea appears
to me to rest on no evidence and no probability, and even if it did, it would
not be valid.”189
As Hobhouse suggests, whether and to what extent intervention through
succession law affects the structure and timing of gifts is an empirical
question. Currently, except in estate and gift taxation, there is little
184. See generally Leslie, supra note 12, at 236 (“Notwithstanding frequent declarations
to the contrary, many courts are as committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in
accordance with prevailing normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary
intent.”).
185. Tate, supra note 168, at 479.
186. POSNER, supra note 19, at 700.
187. Hirsch, supra note 49, at 89 n.203 (emphasis added).
188. ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 224 (London, Chatto & Windus 1880).
189. Id. at 225.
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empirical work investigating the effects of legal rules on the timing and
structure of gifts.190 However, for the theoretical reasons noted above,
courts and commentators should consider the possibility that the law may
have an impact on the donor’s incentives.
4. Other Ex Ante Considerations
This section explores several other factors that are often overlooked from
an ex post perspective. These factors include both reliance and rent seeking
by potential donees; the incentives of fiduciaries, attorneys, and other estate
planning professionals; the probability that donees or potential donees may
contest a will or trust; and the magnitude of litigation costs if parties change
their behavior in response to the legal rule.
First, altering a gratuitous transfer at death may affect other potential
donees. A family member who is disinherited or a donee who receives less
than what the donee expected may suffer disutility based on the disposition
itself. For example, a child who expects to receive a significant bequest
from a parent or to receive an equal share of the parent’s estate may suffer
disappointment if the parent intentionally disinherits the child or provides
less than an equal share of the estate.191 Moreover, a donee (and the donor)
may benefit if the donee is able to engage in ex ante reliance on the donor’s
bequest.192 Restricting a donor’s ability to make a binding promise to the
donee may affect the donee’s ex ante behavior and reduce social welfare.193
Second, donees may engage in rent-seeking behavior.194 Frequently,
potential donees will have a private incentive to take actions to increase
their share of the decedent’s estate.195 But many of these actions are
socially wasteful.196 For example, donees may attempt to convince the
190. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim et al., Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect the Timing of
Private Transfers?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2617, 2617 (2004) (“[H]ouseholds experiencing larger
declines in the expected tax disadvantages of bequests reduced inter vivos transfers relative
to households experiencing small declines in the tax disadvantages of bequests.”).
191. See Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Religiously Inspired Gender-Bias Disinheritance—
What’s Law Got To Do with It?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 669, 670 (2010) (“[D]isinheritance
can disappoint and anger the child, stimulating feelings of rejection.” (citing B. Douglas
Bernheim & Sergei Severinov, Bequests As Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division
Puzzle, 111 J. POL. ECON. 733 (2003))).
192. See Shavell, supra note 157, at 402 (“Before a donee receives a gift, he may take
actions that will increase its value . . . . For example, the nephew may study in preparation
for college; this will make a gift of a college education more useful for him.”); see also
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1276–83 (1980) (discussing the donee’s reliance interest).
193. See Shavell, supra note 157, at 419–20 (offering a formal model of deferred giving
and altruism and concluding that “donors should be able to bind themselves to give gifts”
because donors may want “to distinguish themselves from masqueraders and thereby to
induce donees to rely, enhancing the value of gifts” to both donors and donees).
194. On rent-seeking behavior in the context of succession, see James M. Buchanan, Rent
Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1983).
195. See id. at 74.
196. See id. at 74–75; Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 10; see also Mark L. Ascher,
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 108 (1990) (“When potential donees and
legatees compete for the favor of a donor or testator, they engage in activity that creates no
new wealth. They expend resources over the allocation of wealth already in existence.”).
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donor to increase their allocation of the estate or decrease the shares of
others. Some donees also may attempt to persuade a donor to revoke (or
not to revoke) an existing will or to execute a new will if doing so will
change a disposition in their favor.197 Donees may lobby the legislature to
enact (or not to enact) certain laws that may favor (or disfavor) their
interests.198 They also may file lawsuits challenging the validity of a will or
trust or the interpretation of its distributional provisions, in the hope of
extracting a settlement from the estate.199 Such activities are socially
wasteful insofar as potential donees would not have undertaken them but
for the possibility of increasing their share of the estate.200
Third, the law may affect the incentives of fiduciaries (such as executors
and trustees), attorneys, and other estate planning professionals. For
example, in investing trust assets, trustees had different incentives under the
traditional prudent man rule (where courts often exhibited hindsight bias)
than under the modern prudent investor rule.201 Ex ante analysis also
considers the incentives of attorneys and estate planning professionals who
assist in preparing, drafting, executing, and administering wills and trusts.
The level of care these professionals exercise may depend to a certain
extent on the applicable legal rule. For example, an attorney that is drafting
a will may exercise optimal care if the attorney knows that he or she is
responsible, financially as well as professionally, for any mistake.202 The
attorney may exercise less care if the attorney recognizes that liability for
malpractice is unlikely and that, even if there is an error, a court is likely to
reform the will rather than impose malpractice liability.203 Of course,
attorneys have other motivations, including their professional reputations,
that provide incentives for exercising due care as well.204
Pure rent seeking should be distinguished from an exchange in which a person provides care
for elderly parents or others in anticipation of a gift from the estate, an exchange that may be
welfare enhancing. See supra notes 62–64, 155 and accompanying text.
197. It is worth noting that the possibility of rent-seeking behavior is one argument
against adopting a system of testamentary freedom in which a donor has considerable
discretion in choosing beneficiaries. See Buchanan, supra note 194, at 78.
198. See ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RENT SEEKING (1995); Fred
S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
199. See John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 63, 66 (1978) (stating that most litigation over capacity “is directed towards provoking
pretrial settlements” and “the odor of the strike suit hangs heavily over this field”); see also
Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1685–86 & n.200 (2011).
200. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 194, at 78 (“[I]nvestment in litigation . . . reflects
socially wasteful rent seeking, even if it is now directed toward a different object from that
which occurs when discretionary power remains with the potential donor of transfers.”).
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592
(1988) (“Judicial punctiliousness about establishing and following clear rules, one would
suppose, can influence behavior in the direction of greater productivity or carefulness.”).
203. See Champine, supra note 48, at 439–40.
204. See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice?
An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1241–42 (2006); cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2010) (arguing that firms
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Fourth, the ex ante view recognizes that the probability of litigation and
magnitude of litigation costs are likely to vary depending on the legal rule.
The likelihood of litigation may depend on how a legal rule affects the
donor’s incentives to structure a gift and the donees’ incentives to contest a
will or trust.
It also may depend on how much uncertainty or
unpredictability a rule creates. Likewise, the magnitude of litigation costs
depends on several factors, including the extent to which the donor or
donor’s estate can anticipate and avoid litigation, donees may use litigation
(or its threat) to advance their interests, and courts may invest time and
effort in correcting errors. Litigation costs also depend on the clarity of will
and trust provisions, which themselves may depend on the probability of
legal intervention and the size of an estate. Thus, different legal rules will
create different incentives to litigate and various levels of litigation costs.
* * *
Overall, the ex ante perspective is superior to the ex post perspective
because it incorporates the effects of legal rules on incentives and avoids
the trap of hindsight bias. In succession law, there are a number of ex ante
considerations that courts and commentators often overlook, including a
donor’s happiness, a donor’s incentive to accumulate property, and the
structure and timing of gifts. If donors believe that courts may not facilitate
their intent, donors may not only be less happy and consume more during
life, but also may alter, restrict, or forgo their gifts at death. Adopting an ex
ante perspective does not provide a definitive answer about whether a legal
rule or policy that restricts testamentary freedom is socially desirable or
socially undesirable.205 But evaluating a legal rule or policy from an ex
post perspective is incomplete and potentially misleading. Given the
may have an “incentive to make safe products even in the absence of product liability”
because of market forces such as reputation).
205. While pointing out the importance of incorporating ex ante analysis in evaluating
restrictions on testamentary freedom, this Article has not discussed the social desirability of
such restrictions. For example, in response to a rule prohibiting a certain type of conditional
bequest, a donor may decide to forego the donative transfer. But whether or not this change
in the donor’s actions is socially desirable depends on the condition itself and the policy
reason underlying its prohibition. For example, a trust delaying postponement of a gift until
the beneficiary turns twenty-one (which most courts would uphold) is different from a
conditional bequest that contains a restriction on marriage (which depends on the court and
the circumstances), which differs from a racially discriminatory provision in a will or trust
(if the discrimination is invidious, courts will invalidate the discriminatory provision,
terminate the trust, or apply cy pres to reform a charitable trust). In each case, effectuating
or not effectuating the condition may affect the donor’s ex ante actions, but the question of
whether intervention is socially desirable is a distinct, albeit related, issue.
In addition, it is worth noting that the ex ante approach is not coextensive with the
donor’s ex ante interests. As noted above, in some instances, effectuating a donor’s interests
may conflict with maximizing social welfare, i.e., restricting testamentary freedom may
decrease the donor’s utility, but the decrease might be outweighed by an increase in the
donee’s utility. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Typically, however, the legal
system does not have enough information to second guess the donor’s disposition and raise
social welfare. Moreover, even when society believes that it can make such a judgment ex
post, the ex ante consequences (e.g., on the donor’s incentive to accumulate property or the
structure and timing of the donor’s gift) may militate in favor of effectuating donative intent.
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importance of ex ante considerations, the next section investigates the social
desirability of various justifications for restricting testamentary freedom.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESTRICTING TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM
While effectuating donative intent is typically consistent with
maximizing social welfare, there are several reasons why a donor’s express
wishes may diverge from what is socially desirable: imperfect information,
negative externalities, and intergenerational equity. This Article contends
that, at least theoretically, each of these reasons may provide a justification
for restricting testamentary freedom. This Article then examines two other
reasons why courts may disregard a donor’s intent: maximizing the donees’
ex post interests and discounting the donor’s preferences. It contends that,
from an ex ante perspective, these justifications are problematic.
A. Legitimate Justifications (in Theory)
From an economic perspective, there are several theoretical reasons why
effectuating the donor’s express wishes may diverge from what is socially
optimal, including (1) imperfect information, (2) negative externalities, and
(3) intergenerational equity.206
1. Imperfect Information
One reason why effectuating donative intent is not necessarily consistent
with maximizing social welfare is imperfect information. Future events are
difficult to foresee and unanticipated contingencies may arise. As a result, a
donor may dispose of property in a way that contradicts what the donor
would have wanted with complete information. Moreover, even if
foreseeable, each contingency is costly to specify. Consequently, a donor
may not explicitly provide for the disposition of property under all possible
circumstances.
In either case, an unforeseen or unprovided-for
contingency, judicial intervention may be necessary to carry out the donor’s
probable intent, i.e., the donor’s true plans under perfect information.207
206. In surveying “[v]alid arguments against dead hand control of property,” Shavell
mentions “the cost and impracticality of making highly refined arrangements for dead hand
control,” “harmful external effects,” and “inherent inequality in the wealth of the present
generation versus that of future generations.” SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70–71. I examine
each of these justifications in greater detail. Analyzing the legitimate, as well as illegitimate,
justifications for restricting testamentary freedom is important not only for analytical clarity
but also because many members of the public are unable to articulate why the law should
restrict, or not restrict, a person’s distribution of property at death. See Mary Louise Fellows
et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws
in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 336 (“When respondents were asked
the general question concerning freedom of testamentary disposition, 89 percent thought
there should be no restrictions. When asked to explain, the respondents merely repeated
their beliefs that a person should not be restricted in choosing a distributive plan.”).
207. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70 (“If . . . the plans that are made for the control of
property after death are not reflective of the true detailed plans that would have been made if
the individuals had the time and ability to consider all possibilities, the state’s modification
of their plans may sometimes be justified as an attempt to carry out their true plans.”); cf.
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To amplify, because future events are difficult to predict, “many kinds of
future outcomes would not even be contemplated by a person when making
provisions for the control of property.”208 While a person is alive, one
“reason why a person may modify a will is simply that the writer did not
include a contingency in the will because, at the time the will was written,
the contingency was unlikely or not even contemplated.”209 However, after
death, it is impossible for the donor to modify a disposition on account of
an unforeseen event or unanticipated contingency.210
Given that such “recontracting” is infeasible,211 judicial intervention may
enhance social welfare if a court modifies or interprets a will or trust
consistent with the donor’s probable intent.212 If interpretation or
modification of the donative document were not permitted, then a transfer
pursuant to the donor’s express wishes might be socially undesirable.213
The court’s objective should be to determine the donor’s probable intent,
assuming the donor had foreseen all relevant circumstances and events.214
As a result, intervening to maximize social welfare is not inconsistent with
the donor’s true intent.
Second, even if a donor is able to foresee future contingencies, it may not
be rational for the donor to provide for each particular contingency in the
will or trust. In contract law, Oliver Hart, Oliver Williamson, and others
have pointed out that parties may omit terms to save time, money, and
effort because “many eventualities are hard to anticipate or describe in
advance” and “writing contracts involves costs that rise with the number of
contractual terms.”215 In highlighting a similar phenomenon in the context
of gifts at death, Shavell points out that it would often be irrational for
individuals to “make highly detailed plans for the control of property after
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 cmt. b
(2003) (“The rationale for modifying a donative document is that the donor would have
desired the modification to be made if he or she had realized that the desired tax objectives
would not be achieved.”). One type of unforeseen or unprovided-for contingency that might
alter the donor’s disposition is a change in the applicable law (including, perhaps, a change
in a legal rule favoring the ex post perspective).
208. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70.
209. Id. at 64.
210. POSNER, supra note 19, at 699 (suggesting courts should have the ability to modify
testamentary gifts because there is no possibility of “recontracting” once the donor is dead
and arguing for a “cy pres approach in private as well as charitable trust cases”).
211. Id.
212. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412, 7C U.L.A. 507 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66(1) (2003).
213. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 695.
214. Cf. id. at 696 (“[T]he dilemma of whether to enforce the testator’s intent or to
modify the terms of the will in accordance with changed conditions since his death is often a
false one. A policy of rigid adherence to the letter of the donative instrument is likely to
frustrate both the donor’s purposes and the efficient use of resources.”).
215. Shavell, supra note 16, at 289–90; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999);
Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrӧm, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC
THEORY 71 (1987); Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67
ECONOMETRICA 741 (1999).

1160

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

death.”216 The reason is that “the cost of making a detailed provision is
borne with certainty, whereas the benefit is discounted by the often
extremely small likelihood of the occurrence of a contingency and perhaps
by its remoteness in time.”217 Once again, a court’s intervening to address
a circumstance that a donor did not address explicitly may be consistent
with the donor’s probable intent and enhance social welfare.218
Thus, like contracts, gratuitous transfers at death entail the problem of
imperfect information. Donors are incapable of anticipating all future
contingencies and, even if they could, it would not be cost-effective to
specify each contingency in a will or trust. Unlike contracts, the devisees of
a will or the beneficiaries of a trust can no longer negotiate with the testator
or settlor once he or she is dead if circumstances change or new information
emerges.219 Hence, judicial intervention to modify or interpret the terms of
a gift may be desirable in certain situations, and such intervention may be
consistent with the donor’s probable intent.220 Of course, because courts
also lack perfect information, judicial intervention to modify or interpret the

216. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70.
217. Id.
218. In addition, several cognitive limitations, tangentially related to imperfect
information, may justify restrictions on testamentary freedom. The UPC requires a testator
to be “18 or more years of age.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 144 (2010).
Conversely, a court sometimes employs a more searching inquiry if a testator is elderly or
exhibits signs of senility. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 66 (“The donor’s inability to make
a sound decision might also be suggested as a rationale for state control of bequests; in the
late stages of life, an individual’s judgment is often impaired.”). If a person is insane, a
court will not probate the person’s will because a testator must be of “sound mind.” UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 144; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note
90, at 266 (discussing reasons for the requirement of mental capacity). A court also may not
effectuate a donor’s wishes if the donor was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the
time of executing a will, though evidence of addiction does not negate testamentary capacity.
See Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity,
51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 36 (2006) (noting that the “standard doctrine” is that addiction “does
not preclude the existence of testamentary capacity” (citing In re Herman, 734 N.Y.S.2d 194
(App. Div. 2001); In re Sechrest, 537 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000))). Likewise,
situations involving defects in testamentary capacity due to undue influence or coercion are
cases in which not effectuating wills or trusts as written is clearly beneficial. In each
situation—minority, senility, insanity, intoxication, and undue influence or coercion—the
objective of intervening is not to effectuate the donor’s express wishes. Rather, the aim is to
provide a disposition that most closely approximates the donor’s probable intent.
219. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003) (noting that “the ‘rigor
mortis’ of deadhand control is not present while a property owner is able to respond to
persuasion and evolving circumstances”); see also POSNER, supra note 19, at 696 (“[T]here
is a stronger case for paternalism in the case of wills than in the case of contracts. Contracts
can be modified, but a person cannot modify the terms of his will after he’s dead.”).
220. The objective would be to determine a donor’s probable intent, i.e., the donor’s true
intent with perfect information. Thus, legal intervention because of imperfect information,
including but not limited to changed circumstances, is not restricting testamentary freedom,
but facilitating it. Cf. POSNER, supra note 19, at 696 (“[A] rational donor knows that his
intentions might eventually be thwarted by unpredictable circumstances and may therefore
be presumed to accept implicitly a rule permitting modification of the terms of the bequest in
the event that an unforeseen change frustrates his original intention.”).
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terms of a will or trust has significant costs as well, including error costs
and decision costs.221
2. Negative Externalities
Even if a donor had perfect information, there might still be a legitimate
justification for legal intervention. Specifically, if the donor’s disposition
entails external costs or “externalities,” then effectuating donative intent
might be inconsistent with maximizing social welfare.222 Owners often
impose harm on others by using their property (e.g., pollution from a
factory). Externalities also may arise because of a disposition of property at
death.223 The problem is that an owner (here, the donor) may have an
incentive to undertake an activity (in this case, a gift at death) if the
“activity’s private benefits exceed its private costs even though, as a result
of the externality, the activity is undesirable as its social costs exceed its
social benefits.”224
Consider the disinheritance of minor children.225 Hirsch notes that “one
potential justification for compulsory bequests to children is spillover costs,
which could arise with regard to minor or disabled children who are unable
to fend for themselves.”226 Likewise, Shavell explains that a “dependent
child who does not inherit wealth may receive public support,” and that, as
a result, a “person might reduce or exclude his or her allocation to . . .
children, depending on public support to take up the slack.”227 However,
221. For this reason, whether a court should intervene depends not only on the donor’s
information but also the court’s information, as well as the administrative and litigation costs
of attempting to discern the donor’s probable intent. In theory, if a donor is skeptical about
the possibility of judicial intervention, the donor might insert a “no modification clause” or
another provision specifying either the circumstances in which the court can intervene or the
method of interpretation. That is, some donors may affirmatively choose not to have the
court update their donative documents or not to investigate their probable intent, even in
cases involving imperfect information. Cf. id. (“Some rational donors, mistrustful of judges’
ability to alter the terms of a bequest intelligently in light of changed conditions, might
prefer to assume the risks involved in rigid adherence to the original terms.”).
222. For an overview of the externalities problem, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 77–
109.
223. See id. at 65, 71.
224. Kelly, supra note 199, at 1644, 1649–51 (summarizing the problem with negative
externalities).
225. Suppose Joe has two minor children and assets valued at $4 million. Instead of
devising $4 million in equal shares to his children or providing $2 million to each child in
trust, Joe decides to give all of his property to a favorite charity, thus disinheriting his
children. Joe dies, the executor of Joe’s estate distributes his assets according to Joe’s
wishes, and Joe’s children, both of whom are minors, are left penniless. Joe’s children will
continue to need financial support for food, shelter, education, and health care. The
government, a religious or charitable organization, or a family member must now step in to
provide this support. As a result, Joe’s decision to disinherit his children has external effects
on others who must pay for their care.
226. Hirsch, supra note 29, at 2236; see also Brashier, supra note 9, at 3 (“When the
disinherited child is a minor, unable to provide for himself, society often must bear the cost
of the parent’s disinheriting act.”).
227. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65; cf. Horton, supra note 143, at 1703 (noting that
“trusts can create externalities by excluding certain individuals,” including dependents).

1162

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

despite this potential externality, the UPC and almost every state (except
Louisiana) permit parents to disinherit their minor children.228
While generally permitting the intentional disinheritance of children,
American succession law does restrict the freedom of testation in other
situations involving externalities. For example, a court will not enforce a
devise encouraging an illegal activity that is socially undesirable. If a donor
attempts to devise $1 million to a person in a murder-for-hire scheme,
effectuating the donor’s intent would be socially undesirable.229 Similarly,
in addition to being illegal under the Equal Protection Clause and federal
and state antidiscrimination laws,230 a racial restriction in a will is contrary
to public policy because such a restriction imposes harm on others,
including the victims of discrimination, other individuals within the
targeted group, and society in general.231 In addition, even if an activity is
legal, a court may refrain from enforcing a devise on the basis of public
policy if the devise entails a significant externality. For example, although
disrupting family relationships is often legal, a will provision that attempts
to encourage divorce or separation is unenforceable.232
Moreover, one major justification for spousal rights, such as the UPC’s
elective share,233 is a concern that disinheritance may impose harm on
others. In addition to the harm on the surviving spouse, a concern is that
the donor, knowing “a spouse . . . who does not inherit wealth may receive
public support,” may decide to “reduce or exclude his or her allocation to a
spouse” and that, consequently, “[t]his externality might justify a stipulation
that some minimum fraction of property be given to spouses.”234

228. See Brashier, supra note 9; see also Vincent Rougeau, No Bonds but Those Freely
Chosen: An Obituary for the Principle of Forced Heirship in American Law, 1 CIV. L.
COMMENT. 3 (2008) (exploring the history of forced heirship in Louisiana). The existence or
magnitude of an externality may depend to a certain extent on the sensibilities of individuals
within a particular culture. For example, in some countries, property is viewed more in
terms of families than individuals; filial piety plays a central role; and filial disinheritance is
extremely uncommon. See, e.g., Ya-Hui Hsu, Should China Adopt Taiwan’s Mandatory
Share Doctrine?, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 289, 325–30 (2010) (“Taiwan’s mandatory
share doctrine is a product of the Chinese culture and tradition.”).
229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 cmt. c (2003) (“Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition
in certain instances are . . . provisions encouraging illegal activity . . . .”).
230. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 766–68.
231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 cmt. c; see also SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 71 (noting that restrictions on the use of
property based on race or religion involve harmful external effects because they may
“increase feelings of separateness in the population at large and generally contribute to social
friction”).
232. See, e.g., In re Estate of Owen, 855 N.E.2d 603, 611 (Ind. App. 2006) (“[A]
condition to devise by will, the tendency of which is to encourage divorce or bring about a
separation of husband and wife, is against public policy and void.”).
233. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 93–268 (2010).
234. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65. Posner posits a transaction costs justification for the
elective share. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 701. On the role of transaction costs in
succession, see Kelly supra note 29, at 864–67.
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Likewise, the UPC protects the rights of the decedent’s creditors.235 The
nonpayment of a decedent’s debts, including the ability to circumvent
creditors at death, would impose harm on others and increase the costs of
financing during life.236 Finally, the law restricts testamentary freedom in
several situations involving externalities that are relatively diffuse. These
restrictions include the rule against perpetuities,237 the rule against
accumulations of income,238 and the estate tax.239
3. Intergenerational Equity
A third theoretical justification for restricting testamentary freedom is
intergenerational equity between the interests of the present generation and
future generations. Those who are now living may have incentives to use
and dispose of property in ways that benefit their own interests. However,
the living may not have an incentive to incorporate fully the interests of
future generations. Thus, their incentive to use and transfer property may
diverge from what is socially optimal.240
Kaplow and Shavell have each put forward a version of this argument in
two separate contexts. In discussing a rationale for subsidizing gifts,
Kaplow argues that there may be too little giving because donors do not
have an incentive to incorporate the full value of their gifts to their donees.
The level of gift giving may be suboptimal because, although donors may
obtain an altruistic benefit from the effect of their gifts on the utility of their
donees, they do not take into account that the benefit to the donees is itself
235. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-801 to -816, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 208–66.
236. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 44 (describing one of probate’s “core
functions” as “protect[ing] creditors by providing a procedure for payment of the decedent’s
debts” (emphasis omitted)); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of
the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1120–25 (1984) (discussing creditor
protection under probate and nonprobate transfers); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III, pt.
8 general comment, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 208 (“Commercial and consumer credit depends upon
efficient collection procedures.”).
237. See Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2117 (2003) (“Without the
Rule, or some substitute, settlors are likely to create trusts that generate agency costs and
externalities without generating commensurate benefits.”). But cf. Richard A. Epstein, Past
and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705
(1986) (“The rule against perpetuities and its kindred rules are not directed toward any kind
of externality.”).
238. Cf. Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 501, 513–16 (2008) (discussing justifications for rule against accumulations in
income and concluding that the “shift in the nature of wealth from land to financial assets
and the revolution in trust investment law, taken together, render obsolete the concern over
economic distortions stemming from accumulations in trust”).
239. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 570 (“Estate taxation might . . . seem necessary to
prevent the creation over time of huge fortunes that might stimulate political unrest.”);
SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65 (“One might say that allowing families to retain large
amounts of wealth detracts from social cohesion because it allows elites to sustain
themselves.”).
240. Given that the present generation may not have a private incentive to incorporate
fully the social costs (or benefits) of their actions on future generations, the argument based
on intergenerational equity is a variation of the argument based on negative (or positive)
externalities.
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relevant to social welfare.241 For example, suppose an altruistic person is
deciding whether to consume her property or give it away. Consuming the
property increases the person’s utility by $75. Giving the property away
increases her utility by $1 for every $1 increase in the donee’s utility. If the
donee values the gift at $50, the donor will have a private incentive to
consume the property ($75 > $50), even though a gift is socially desirable
($75 < $100). Thus, due to this positive externality, donative transfers,
including gifts at death, may diverge from what is socially desirable.
Shavell makes an argument with similar economic logic but applies it
explicitly in the context of tradeoffs between the present generation and
future generations. He argues, “By virtue of its priority in time, the present
generation owns the whole of the earth and all the things on it.”242 As a
result, “the present generation has a greater ability to control property than
is socially desirable, presuming that the measure of social welfare accords
substantial weight to future generations.”243 For example, suppose the
world consists of two generations, and the utility of individuals in each
generation depends on their consumption of an exhaustible resource, oil.
Each member of the present generation, Generation 1, consumes 900 units
of oil. Each member of the future generation, Generation 2, then consumes
what is left, 100 units of oil. Assuming a diminishing marginal utility of oil
(and ignoring the issue of intertemporal discounting), shifting oil from
Generation 1 to Generation 2 would raise total utility. Of course, given its
priority in time, Generation 1 can exercise control over property, not only
by consuming it during life, but also by controlling it after death.
Therefore, Shavell suggests that “in order preserve intergenerational equity,
limiting the ability of the present generation to control property after their
death may be socially warranted.”244
Although the present generation may have an incentive to give too little
or consume too much, the inquiry is complicated by several factors. The
idea of intergenerational equity is based on the premise of treating the
present generation and future generations equally from the perspective of
social utility. However, future generations may benefit from advances in
technology and investments in infrastructure made by the present
generation.245 For example, as a result of scientific and technological
innovation, future generations may experience fewer diseases, less hunger,
and less misery. If so, future generations might be better off than the
present one, meaning there would be less of a need for the law to restrict

241. Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, supra note 5, at 469–77.
242. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 71.
243. Id. Shavell notes that “those alive today might care very little about the well-being
of individuals ten generations in the future, but a social welfare measure might accord
similar weight to the well-being of individuals ten generations in the future as it does to the
well-being of the present generation.” Id. at 71 n.74.
244. Id. at 71.
245. Moreover, depending on the applicable discount rate, investing now in research and
technology may bestow greater benefits on future generations than directly transferring
property across generations.
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testamentary freedom to preserve assets for the future.246 Therefore, it is
unclear whether such intervention is theoretically necessary or desirable
(even assuming it would be practical). In any event, it does not appear that
the legal system usually relies on this justification, except in certain limited
contexts in environmental law, such as protecting endangered species,247
and intellectual property, such as preserving the public domain.248
B. Illegitimate Justifications
In addition to imperfect information, negative externalities, and
intergenerational equity, are there other justifications for limiting a donor’s
freedom of testation? This section explores two additional justifications for
legal intervention: (1) maximizing the ex post interests of donees, which is
increasingly common; and (2) discounting the idiosyncratic preferences of
donors, which is interesting but relatively rare. From an economic view,
both of these justifications are illegitimate.
1. Ex Post Interests of Donees
An increasingly common justification for restricting testamentary
freedom is that doing so is necessary to promote the interests of the donees.
In certain ways, including the creation of perpetual trusts, donors have
attempted to extend the dead hand further than ever before. Yet, on
numerous issues, from conditional bequests to modification of trusts, law
reformers and courts are increasingly privileging the interests of the donees,
even if doing so is inconsistent with the intent of the donor.
Several other commentators have noted this development. For example,
in The New Direction of American Trust Law, Thomas Gallanis argues that
“American trust law, after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving in a
new direction, with a reassertion of the interests and rights of the
beneficiaries.”249 Gallanis contends the “modern approach” to doctrines
like spendthrift protection, administrative deviation, and trust modification
illustrates that the pendulum is swinging from a “pro-settlor direction”
toward the beneficiaries as “trust law balances the desires of the settlor with
the property rights of the trust’s beneficiaries.”250 Similarly, in discussing
“the larger context of legal reform affecting the scope of dead hand
246. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 689 (“In general, every generation is wealthier than
the one before, and this appears to be due far more to increases in knowledge than to deferral
of consumption by the previous generation.”). On the other hand, there is also the possibility
that future people will be worse off, suffering from more war, disease, or natural disasters. If
so, intervention may theoretically be needed to prevent the present generation from giving
too little to future generations.
247. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); see also Cass R.
Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 188–207 (2007) (discussing the problem of
intergenerational equity).
248. See generally Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Intellectual Property, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 103.
249. Gallanis, supra note 12, at 216.
250. Id. at 237.
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control,” Reid Weisbord observes “a retreat away from dead hand control in
the broader law of trusts . . . [, which] has undergone reforms that provide
greater protection for beneficiaries.”251 Weisbord argues that this “modern
trend in trust law embodies features that tend to weaken the settlor’s ability
to exercise perpetual control over property held in trust.”252
To be sure, there is a long tradition within Anglo-American jurisprudence
and political philosophy that suggests that the wishes of the dead should not
trump the interests of the living. In the late eighteenth century, Thomas
Jefferson thought it “self-evident” that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the
living; that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”253 Likewise,
William Godwin asserted that it would be “the most extravagant fiction,
which would enlarge the empire of the proprietor beyond his natural
existence, and enable him to dispose of events, when he is himself no
longer in the world.”254 Almost a century later, Hobhouse declared:
What I consider to be not conjectural, but proved by experience in all
human affairs, is, that people are the best judges of their own concerns; or
if they are not, that it is better for them, on moral grounds, that they
should manage their own concerns for themselves, and that it cannot be
wrong continually to claim this liberty for every Generation of mortal
men.255

The U.S. Supreme Court, noting that the legislature could “abolish the
power of testamentary disposition over property,” has emphasized that “the
dead hand rules succession only by sufferance.”256 Thus, in addition to
recent developments in law reform, there is a long tradition that suggests
that the wishes of the dead should not control if doing so would be contrary
to the interests of the living.
In contrast, a number of legal scholars and political philosophers have
argued that courts should defer to the wishes of the donor even after the
donor is dead.257 Moreover, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s
251. Reid Kress Weisbord, Trust Term Extension 5 (Oct. 28, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=2346522.
252. Id. at 33. Weisbord points out that this modern trend in trust law favoring
beneficiaries is “particularly true of reforms envisioned by national law reform organizations
such as the ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
responsible for publishing the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code,
respectively.” Id. In addition, Jeffrey Cooper observes that, over time, there has been a
“subtle shift” in trust and fiduciary law: “While the case law repeatedly reaffirms the
traditional primacy of a settlor’s intent, the literature increasingly emphasizes the needs of
trust beneficiaries and the dictates of modern investment theory.” Cooper, supra note 46, at
1172 (footnotes omitted). He concludes that “whereas the settlor’s word was once the sole
source of authority, increasingly now ‘[t]here are three voices to which the fiduciary must
listen,’” namely, the settlor, the beneficiaries, and the market. Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Will of Dumont, No. 1956TT443, 2004 WL 1468746, at *5 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
June 25, 2004)).
253. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 20, at 103.
254. GODWIN, supra note 182, at 718.
255. HOBHOUSE, supra note 188, at 184–85.
256. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
257. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Basis of Succession, in THE RATIONAL BASIS
OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 413, 420–21 (John H. Wigmore & Albert Kocourek eds., 1923);
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pronouncement that the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance (as
well as recent law reforms in favor of donees), most state and probate courts
have continued to defer to a donor’s intent in determining the meaning of
wills and trusts.258 Yet, one of the chief concerns in this perennial debate is
that, irrespective of the desirability of allowing dead hand control, the state
is likely to intervene in gratuitous transfers at death: “The generation that is
alive always enjoys the power to use property that the dead would have
wanted to control and certainly has an interest in doing so.”259
The difficulty, of course, is not that the law recognizes the interests of the
donees. After all, most gifts are given for the benefit of their donees.
Rather, the difficulty is if courts and commentators fail to distinguish the
interests of the donees from an ex post perspective versus the interests of
the donees from an ex ante perspective. That is, intervening to maximize
the donees’ ex post interests, as distinct from the donees’ ex ante interests,
is not a legitimate justification for restricting testamentary freedom.
From an ex post perspective, restricting testamentary freedom in order to
maximize the donees’ interests would be socially desirable. However, as
discussed, the ex post perspective does not incorporate the donor’s ex ante
interests, including the donor’s happiness.260 Furthermore, the ex post
perspective does not recognize that allowing the donees’ ex post interests to
trump the donor’s ex ante wishes may be detrimental to the donees
themselves because doing so can be inconsistent with the donees’ ex ante
interests as a class.
Disregarding donative intent may harm the donees as a class for a simple
reason. In response to a legal rule or judicial intervention, a donor can
“wise up” and alter her behavior. If the donor believes that the courts will
not facilitate her intent, the donor may have an incentive to work less or
consume more during life.261 Consequently, the donor may end up owning
less property at death, meaning the donees will have less property to inherit
from the donor.
Moreover, even if the law does not alter the donor’s incentive to work,
save, or invest, the donor may alter a gift. As discussed above, the donor
may change the timing of a gift, choose different donees, or forgo the gift
altogether.262 As a result, donees as a class may be worse off if courts
intervene on their behalf, even if it may be rational for individual donees to
Epstein, supra note 237; see also Gallanis, supra note 12, at 237 (“In the late nineteenth
century and for much of the twentieth century, American trust law moved in a contractarian,
pro-settlor direction.”). For an analysis of the arguments favoring or disfavoring dead hand
control, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 67–71.
258. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Weisbord, supra note 251, at 34
(“With regard to the new direction of trust law, state legislatures have been slow to embrace
the most aggressive reform efforts to contain dead hand control and recent case law reflects
continued judicial fidelity to settlor intent when beneficiaries seek to upset the donor’s
reasons for creating the trust.”).
259. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 72.
260. See supra Part II.C.1.
261. See supra Part II.C.2.
262. See supra Part II.C.3.
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attempt to modify a donor’s wishes. If courts adopt an ex post perspective
in determining whether to alter or modify a gratuitous transfer at death, they
may end up favoring a legal rule in which everyone, including the donees,
is worse off ex ante.
Thus, while an economic analysis of succession law suggests that there
are several theoretical justifications for restricting testamentary freedom—
imperfect information, negative externalities, and intergenerational equity—
disregarding donative intent to maximize the ex post interests of donees is
problematic. Consequently, legislators and courts, as well as legal scholars
and law reformers, should carefully analyze whether the legal limitations on
testamentary freedom are socially desirable from an ex ante perspective.
2. Idiosyncratic Preferences of Donors
Most donors transfer their property at death to family members, friends,
and charitable organizations. However, occasionally, a donor may have
highly idiosyncratic preferences. Suppose a donor creates a multibilliondollar trust for the care of stray dogs.263 For example, Leona Helmsley left
between $4 and $8 billion to a charitable trust for (1) the care of dogs; and
(2) medical and health care services for indigent people, especially children.
Subsequently, Helmsley deleted the provision benefitting indigent
children.264 Should the law intervene to prevent Helmsley from using all
her money for the care of dogs? What if there are other, arguably more
urgent, needs such as providing children with food, shelter, and clothing?
As noted above, American succession law usually does not evaluate the
dispositive provisions of a donative transfer for their “wisdom, fairness, or
reasonableness.”265 However, courts may refrain from enforcing a will or
trust that entails a gift that is clearly for a “capricious” purpose.266 Thus,
while the law typically focuses on facilitating the donor’s intent, in certain
extreme cases in which a donor’s preferences are highly idiosyncratic, such
as giving billions of dollars for the care of dogs, a court may not enforce the
gift or may reduce the amount of the gift.267

263. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 425 (“Almost every state has enacted
legislation that permits a trust for a pet animal for the life of the animal and often other noncharitable purposes such as perpetual maintenance of a grave.”).
264. See Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch: The Legal Battle over Trust Funds for Pets, NEW
YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 38.
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (2003).
266. See Tamara York, Protecting Minor Children from Parental Disinheritance: A
Proposal for Awarding a Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate, 1997 MICH. ST. L. REV.
861, 878–79 (“Where the testator’s provision is merely capricious and the performance of
the provision will benefit no one, the courts will not compel its execution, despite the wishes
of the testator.”).
267. Cf. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408–409, 7C U.L.A. 490–95 (2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-907(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 239–40 (2010). For example, in the Helmsley
case, the court ultimately reduced the award to Helmsley’s dog, Trouble, from $12 million to
$2 million. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 426. At Trouble’s death in 2010,
the funds remaining in the dog’s trust were added to Helmsley’s charitable trust, which was
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From an economic perspective, restricting testamentary freedom because
a donor’s preferences are idiosyncratic, even highly idiosyncratic, is not
warranted.268 On the economic view, all preferences are subjective, and all
preferences count in the social welfare function.269 Consequently, there is
no objective standard to say that the utility that Ms. Helmsley derives from
taking care of these dogs should not count in social welfare. Consider as
well that during life Helmsley was free to spend as much of her money for
the care of dogs as she wished.270 Of course, if a donative transfer—either
during life or at death—entails negative externalities, these externalities
may provide an independent justification for restricting the transfer.271 But,
from an economic perspective, the idiosyncratic or objectionable nature of a
donor’s preferences would not, by itself, provide a legitimate justification
for intervening in a donor’s disposition of property.
This type of example, while relatively rare, may illustrate one limitation
of the economic approach. Economic analysis assumes that preferences are
subjective and does not question an individual’s preferences. Therefore,
unless a donor is imposing external harm on others, there is no economic
justification for second-guessing the substance of the donor’s disposition.
To be sure, there are strong policy reasons for why granting courts broad
authority to second-guess the choices of donors might be problematic.
Having courts regularly exercise their discretion in evaluating whether gifts
are “socially desirable” would entail significant information costs and
administrative costs.272 Even if courts were institutionally capable of
making this determination at a reasonable cost, preventing donors from
circumventing such limitations would involve substantial enforcement
costs.273 Because courts may have difficulty weighing the social costs and
benefits of each gift, the law typically defers to the donor’s intent. But, in

worth more than $4 billion in 2012 (although the courts had ruled that the trustees were not
required to use the funds in the charitable trust only for the care of dogs). Id.
268. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 418–31 (“[T]he arguments that are usually
presented against crediting objectionable preferences are problematic.”).
269. See id. (“Under a welfare economic analysis, any actual preference is given weight
because it reflects an individual’s actual well-being; there is no a priori basis under welfare
economics for ignoring certain preferences.”).
270. Comparing inter vivos gifts and testamentary gifts is often illuminating in evaluating
the potential justifications for restricting testamentary freedom. If a certain type of gift (e.g.,
gifts for the care of dogs) is legally permissible during life, then the question is under what
circumstances, if any, the same gift should not be permissible at death. Other examples in
which this distinction may be relevant are conditional gifts, see infra text accompanying note
286, and the destruction of property, see infra notes 308–09, 315 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part III.A.2; see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 427–29
(suggesting that externalities is one reason that “satisfying certain types of preferences may
be counterproductive in terms of the overall well-being of members of society”).
272. Cf. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 12 n.42 (noting that an approach “giving
courts (instead of testators) discretion to divide estates . . . would . . . entail substantially
higher information and administrative costs”).
273. Cf. id. at 11 (“A secondary justification for the right of testation is that it would in
practice be difficult to curtail. Were lawmakers to rescind the power of the will, testators
would find other, less efficient ways to direct the distribution of their wealth.”).
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extreme cases, the divergence between a donor’s private interest and the
social interest could justify modifying a gratuitous transfer at death.274
IV. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM
Having explored the primary justifications for restricting testamentary
freedom—both legitimate (imperfect information, negative externalities,
and intergenerational equity) and illegitimate (maximizing the donees’ ex
post interests and ignoring a donor’s idiosyncratic preferences), this Article
applies these justifications to evaluate the law’s limitations on the freedom
of testation. The objective is to investigate the extent to which existing law
converges with or diverges from these economic justifications. Throughout
the analysis, I also suggest ways in which legislatures and courts could
incorporate economic insights into law reform and judicial review.
A. Three Contested Examples
I begin by analyzing three examples involving dead hand control:
(1) conditional bequests and incentive trusts, (2) the destruction of property
at death, and (3) trust modification and termination.
1. Conditional Bequests and Incentive Trusts
Historically, donors have included a wide variety of conditions in their
bequests.275 In modern estate planning, “conditional gifts . . . are typically
made in trust,” i.e., “incentive trusts.”276 Among the most common types
of conditions in trusts are incentives for educational attainment, conditions
based on deeply held moral and religious beliefs, and incentives for work
and productivity.277

274. Another example would be gifts that are racially discriminatory. Gifts involving
discrimination entail negative effects on others, and these negative externalities provide a
justification for prohibiting such gifts. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
However, even assuming the “benefits” to the donor of discriminating exceed the social
costs of the donor’s discrimination, society might prohibit the gift on the basis that such
“benefits” should not count in social welfare. See John J. Donohue, Antidiscrimination Law,
in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 1387, 1418 (“The moral
judgment that discriminatory preferences should not enter the social welfare calculus might
be analogized to the standard philosophical argument that malicious preferences—those
benefits that derive from the suffering of others—must be outside the welfare calculus.”); cf.
Shelly Kreiczer Levy & Meital Pinto, Property and Belongingness: Rethinking GenderBiased Disinheritance, 21 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 119, 119 (2011) (arguing that “the law
should not protect gender-biased bequests”).
275. For example, testators may include conditions that discourage a surviving spouse
from remarrying, see, e.g., In re Estate of Robertson, 859 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
prohibit a child from renting property while married to a specific person, see, e.g., In re
Estate of Owen, 855 N.E.2d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), and encourage a devisee to marry a
person of a particular religion. On conditional bequests, see generally Hirsch, supra note 49.
276. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 9–10. On incentive trusts, see Marjorie J.
Stephens, Incentive Trusts: Considerations, Uses, and Alternatives, 29 ACTEC J. 5 (2003),
and Tate, supra note 168.
277. See Tate, supra note 168, at 453.
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To illustrate, consider the gift at issue in the classic case of Shapira v.
Union National Bank.278 In Shapira, the testator, Dr. David Shapira, left a
share of his residuary estate to his son, Daniel, provided that “he is married
at the time of my death to a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish,” or
that, within seven years after the testator’s death, he marries “a Jewish girl
whose both parents were Jewish.”279 Dr. Shapira provided a gift over: if
Daniel was not so married after seven years, Daniel’s share was to go to the
State of Israel.280
In rejecting Daniel’s claim that the restrictions upon marriage in the will
were unconstitutional or contrary to public policy, the court considered
whether this partial restraint on marriage was reasonable. In making this
determination, the court analyzed, among other things, Daniel’s age (21)
and whether he had a “reasonable latitude of choice” of eligible women.281
Ultimately, the court concluded that “public policy should not, and does not
preclude the fulfillment of Dr. Shapira’s purpose, and that in accordance
with the weight of authority in this country, the conditions contained in his
will are reasonable restrictions upon marriage, and valid.”282
From an ex post perspective, Daniel’s claim seems strong and the court’s
conclusion seems erroneous. In challenging the condition, Daniel clearly
preferred to receive his share of the estate outright, rather than subject to
any conditions, including conditions on whom he could or could not marry.
He believed that the condition in his father’s will was unreasonable,
especially given his fundamental right to marry, and he argued that his
father’s dead hand should not interfere with or control such a personal and
important decision.
Several scholars are sympathetic to Daniel’s dilemma. Posner suggests
that, in cases like Shapira, perhaps judges should have the power to modify
conditions on testamentary gifts using a doctrine like cy pres:
Consider . . . the possibilities for modification that would exist if the gift
were inter vivos rather than testamentary. As the deadline approached,
the son might come to his father and persuade him that a diligent search
had revealed no marriageable Jewish girl who would accept him. The
father might be persuaded to grant an extension or otherwise relax the
condition. If the father is dead, this kind of “recontracting” is impossible,
and the presumption that the condition is a reasonable one fails. This
argues for applying the cy pres approach in private as well as charitable
trust cases . . . .283

In addition, in analyzing testamentary restraints on conjugal and religious
choices—what he describes as “posthumous meddling”—Jeffrey Sherman

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 832.
POSNER, supra note 19, at 699.
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argues that a condition like the one in Shapira should be per se invalid.284
Sherman contends that “a blanket rule invalidating all testamentary
restraints that condition bounty on the legatee’s ‘proper’ choice of spouse is
simpler and more predictable in its application, and more principled in its
foundation, than the current judicial response.”285
The views of Posner and Sherman appear to be consistent with the
modern trend regarding conditional bequests and incentive trusts. In 1974,
at the time of the Shapira decision, it may have been true that the “great
weight of authority in the United States” was that “gifts conditioned upon
the beneficiary’s marrying within a particular religious class of faith are
reasonable.”286 Now, by contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
invalidates trusts that are “contrary to public policy”287 and suggests that
these types of cases are “unfortunate.”288
From an ex ante perspective, are there other considerations that may be
relevant? Of course, the testator, Dr. David Shapira, as well as similarly
situated testators, might prefer for the court to enforce these types of
conditions. But one question might be: what would Dr. Shapira have done
ex ante if he had known or believed a court would not enforce such a
condition ex post? Consider three possible scenarios. First, Shapira might
have made the same bequest to his son Daniel outright in fee simple, i.e.,
without any conditions. Second, to circumvent the court’s refusal to
enforce the condition, Shapira may have relied upon a secret trust, in which
another person would hold property for Daniel’s benefit and distribute the
property to Daniel in accordance with Shapira’s prior instructions. Third,
Shapira may have chosen to leave Daniel no gift or a much smaller bequest.
From the ex ante perspective, i.e., at the time that Dr. Shapira is deciding
how to structure his gift, both Daniel and his father may be better off if the
law does not prohibit the condition. By assuring Shapira and other donors
that a court will enforce the condition, the law at least gives Daniel and
other donees an option to comply with the condition. If the condition is
unenforceable, Daniel may have no choice at all, because David may decide
to structure the bequest differently and leave Daniel nothing at all. In this
case, if Shapira and his son would have negotiated in advance, which would
Daniel have chosen: having an option to comply with and thereby receive
the gift, or complete disinheritance? If Daniel would prefer an option to
284. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of
Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273,
1275.
285. Id. at 1322.
286. Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 829.
287. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) (2003).
288. Id. Other states retain the traditional approach. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg,
919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009) (concluding that a trust clause providing that a grandchild would
be considered deceased for trust purposes if he married outside the Jewish faith did not
violate public policy). Similarly, Senator Joseph Lieberman, as executor of his uncle’s $48
million estate, had to decide whether to enforce a restriction that would have disinherited
two of his cousins for marrying persons who were not born Jewish. See Phil Kuntz & Bob
Davis, A Beloved Uncle’s Will Tests Diplomatic Skills of Joseph Lieberman—Document
Disinherits Children Who Failed Religious Test, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2000, at A1.
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comply over disinheritance, then a court’s refusing to enforce the
conditional gift may make Daniel, as well as his father, worse off. In
addition, during his life, Shapira could have given the same conditional gift
to his son, even if he was unwilling to renegotiate the condition.289
Posner himself recognizes that the applicable legal rule may affect how
donors structure their gifts at the outset. He notes, “The strongest objection
to these paternalistic interventions is that in the long run, as testators ‘wise
up’ to the courts’ policy of refusing to enforce conditions that the judges
deem unreasonable, they will curtail bequests.”290 He explains, “The
refusal of courts to enforce such conditions will not make such people
change their minds, but only change their wills.”291 Thus, in cases like
Shapira, facilitating donative intent may be consistent not only with
maximizing the donor’s interest but also with promoting social welfare.292
Indeed, Daniel himself, as well as similarly situated donees, might benefit if
the court enforces this type of conditional bequest.293
2. Destruction of Property at Death294
One of the most extraordinary assertions of dead hand control arises in
cases involving the “right to destroy” property at death.295 In a few cases, a
289. I thank Barry Cushman for a number of insightful comments about Shapira.
290. POSNER, supra note 19, at 700.
291. Id.
292. Of course, it is possible that intervening in such cases could increase social welfare,
if the donor has imperfect information (in which case, intervention might be consistent with
testamentary freedom) or the gift entails a significant negative externality (in which case,
there may be a legitimate justification for overriding testamentary freedom). On the latter
possibility, see supra note 231 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if invalidating a
condition decreases the donor’s utility, if the donor still gives the gift outright to the donee, it
is possible that social welfare may increase if the increase in the donee’s utility exceeds the
decrease in the donor’s utility. See supra note 67.
293. Cases involving university donors who restrict the use of donations are similar to
conditional gifts. In such cases, a donor, donor’s estate, or donor’s family have attempted to
enforce conditions on how universities may use a donation, with varying degrees of success.
Compare Elizabeth Mehren, Yale To Return Bass’ $20-Million Donation, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
15, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-03-15/news/mn-43008_1_bass-family, with Matt
Westmoreland, University Gains Control over Robertson Endowment in Settlement, DAILY
PRINCETONIAN (Dec. 1, 2008), http://dailyprincetonian.com/news/2008/12/university-gainscontrol-over-robertson-endowment-in-settlement/. In other cases involving university
donors, courts may refuse to enforce a condition that is racially discriminatory. Compare
Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (enforcing condition on a gift to Vanderbilt University that required a
dormitory to be named “Confederate Memorial Hall”), with Coffee v. William Marsh Rice
Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (voiding trust provisions establishing Rice as
a free institution for the “white inhabitants” of Texas).
294. In an earlier article, I discuss why ex ante analysis may be relevant in analyzing the
issue of destruction of property at death. Much of the following section incorporates that
earlier discussion of this issue. See Kelly, supra note 29, at 882–85.
295. In recent years, several scholars have analyzed an owner’s right to destroy property.
See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005); see also
JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
37–38 (8th ed. 2009); JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999); SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68–69.
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testator has instructed an executor to destroy the testator’s home or other
buildings.296 For example, in Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.,297 Louis
Woodruff Johnston owned a home in an affluent neighborhood of St. Louis,
Missouri. Johnston died on January 14, 1973, and by her will directed her
executor to destroy her home, sell the land, and transfer the proceeds to her
estate.298 Plaintiffs, owners of neighboring parcels, objected to this
provision of Johnston’s will, arguing, among other things, that razing
Johnston’s home would adversely affect their property rights and be
contrary to public policy.299
Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the neighbors, concluding that, by
mandating that the executor enforce the provisions of the will, “all are
harmed and only the caprice of the dead testatrix is served.”300 The court
reasoned: “Destruction of the house harms the neighbors, detrimentally
affects the community, causes monetary loss in excess of $39,000.00 to the
estate and is without benefit to the dead woman.”301 The court added, “A
well-ordered society cannot tolerate the waste and destruction of resources
when such acts directly affect important interests of other members of that
society.”302
Perhaps more common are situations in which the testator has an interest
in destroying personal property, such as private papers or diaries,303
unpublished manuscripts,304 or unfinished symphonies.305 For example,
Justice Hugo Black believed the “private notes of the justices relating to
Court conferences should not be published posthumously.”306 But suppose
Justice Black had not destroyed his conference notes before death and that
his will had directed his executor to destroy his notes. The question is:
“Should a court order destruction of the notes, which might have enormous
value to a Court historian?”307 Or would facilitating freedom of disposition
296. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (examining a testator’s direction to an executor “to cause our home . . . to be razed and
to sell the land upon which it is located”); In re Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (Sur. Ct. 1977)
(discussing a settlor’s order to a trustee to raze all buildings on two properties other than
garage and tool shed); cf. In re Scott’s Will, 93 N.W. 109, 109 (Minn. 1903) (confronting a
testator’s order to an executor to destroy “money or cash or other evidence of credit”).
297. 524 S.W.2d at 210.
298. Id. at 211.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 214.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 217.
303. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 812 (“The destruction of diaries and other papers
is commonplace, even when those written works have enormous economic value.” (citing
Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 1992))).
304. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 699–700; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note
90, at 15.
305. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 15.
306. Id. at 37; see also SAX, supra note 295, at 93–116 (discussing papers of the Supreme
Court justices); ALEXANDRA K. WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE 31–34 (1986) (discussing the justices’ collections of
personal and professional papers and noting that several justices, including Owen Josephus
Roberts and Edward Douglas White, purposely destroyed their papers).
307. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 37.
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to this extent represent the triumph of the dead hand over the lives of the
living? Recent cases suggest there is a general trend among the courts not
to allow testators to destroy socially valuable property at death.308
Ex post, there is a plausible justification for distinguishing between
destruction of property during life, which the law generally permits, and
destruction of property at death, which courts increasingly do not permit.
During life, owners directly internalize the burdens and benefits of their
actions. Thus, it is usually safe to assume that an owner will destroy
property only if he or she believes the benefits of doing so outweigh the
costs.309 By contrast, it would appear that, after death, the owner no longer
internalizes the burdens and benefits of her actions. Thus, an owner might
destroy property once dead, even if others might benefit from the property.
In other words, the destruction of property at death might entail waste.310
Ex ante, however, there are additional considerations. First, if a court is
unwilling to allow an owner to destroy property at death, the owner may
experience a loss during life.311 Justice Black, for example, may have
experienced anxiety about the possible publication of his notes. Second,
knowing a court will not enforce such a provision, the owner may choose to
destroy the property during life (i.e., sooner than the owner otherwise
would have destroyed the property).312 Justice Black died shortly after
destroying his notes,313 but suppose that, after destroying his notes, he had
recovered, remained on the Supreme Court, and wished to consult the notes
he had destroyed. Third, an owner’s inability to destroy property at death
may reduce the incentive to create property during life.314 Justice Black (or
other justices) may decide not to take notes during the Court’s conferences.
Fourth, prohibiting destruction could alter how the testator or other parties
act and speak today. Justice Black’s chief concern was that posthumously
publishing the justices’ notes might adversely affect the Court’s deliberative

308. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 796 (“Based on a reading of recent judicial
opinions, it appears that the conventional wisdom has turned against permitting a property
owner to destroy valuable property.”).
309. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 518.
310. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 796 (“Concern about wasting valuable resources
is, by far, the most commonly voiced justification for restricting an owner’s ability to destroy
her property.” (citing Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right To Waste?, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76 (Stephen R. Munzer ed.,
2001))).
311. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 295, at
37 (asking rhetorically: “[I]f the testator expects that her wishes for post-death destruction
of her property will not be followed, will she suffer a loss (in money or pleasure) during life
from knowing that her destructive wishes will not be honored after her death?”).
312. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 549 (“In the case of the direction to destroy the art
work, a testator can destroy the work himself if he doesn’t think the direction will be
enforced.”); cf. supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the “King Lear
problem”).
313. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 14.
314. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65 (interfering with bequests “lowers . . . incentives
to work” because a “person will not work as hard to accumulate property if he cannot then
bequeath it as he pleases”).
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process.315 In any event, a testator may internalize the costs of destruction,
even destruction after death, because the testator bears the opportunity costs
of not selling a remainder interest in the property during life.316
Of course, there may be other economic justifications for restricting a
testator’s freedom to destroy property at death. Perhaps a testator did not
foresee or failed to specify all potential contingencies and, due to an
unforeseen or unprovided-for contingency, destruction is inconsistent with
the testator’s probable intention.317 Or maybe, as in Eyerman, destroying
the property will impose harmful effects on neighbors.318 Perhaps future
generations value the property’s existence more than the testator values its
destruction and there is no market mechanism to facilitate a mutually
beneficial exchange.319 Each of these economic justifications may provide
a legitimate reason for disallowing a person to destroy property at death.
However, it is impossible to evaluate a testator’s “right to destroy” property
at death in particular, or dead hand control in general, without incorporating
ex ante considerations into the analysis.320
3. Trust Modification and Termination
The legal systems of the United Kingdom and United States embody very
different perspectives on wealth transmission through donative trusts.
Representative of these differences are the legal rules governing trust
modification and termination. In either legal system, the settlor has the
ability not only to modify or terminate a revocable trust but also to modify
or terminate an irrevocable trust if the settlor and all the beneficiaries agree.
But suppose, as is often the case, that a settlor refuses to consent or is
unable to consent (e.g., because the settlor is dead). The United Kingdom
and United States then diverge on a fundamental question: Are the
beneficiaries permitted to modify or terminate an irrevocable trust if all the
beneficiaries—but not the settlor—agree to do so?
In the United Kingdom, if all the beneficiaries consent, the law permits
trust modification or termination. The doctrine is well established, having
315. See JOHN PAUL FRANK, INSIDE HUGO L. BLACK: THE LETTERS 61–62 (2000); see also
WIGDOR, supra note 306, at 48 (reporting that Justice Black’s son recalled that his father
believed that “reports by one Justice of another’s conduct in the heat of a difference might
unfairly and inaccurately reflect history”).
316. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68 (“[T]he detriment to the living due to dead hand
control of property is not ignored by a person who wants dead hand control, but rather is
taken into at least implicit account by such a person.”); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 295,
at 840.
317. See supra Part III.A; see also POSNER, supra note 19, at 699–700; SHAVELL, supra
note 10, at 70.
318. See supra Part III.B; see also Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210,
214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (“Destruction of the house harms the neighbors . . . .”).
319. See supra Part III.C. Note, however, that this rationale generally does not limit a
testator’s right to destroy property during life, except in certain limited circumstances such
as historical preservation, endangered species, and an artist’s moral rights.
320. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 808 (“[An] ex ante perspective can be
determinative when society must decide whether to permit or prohibit the destruction of
certain kinds of property.”).
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been articulated almost two centuries ago in Saunders v. Vautier.321 In
Saunders, Richard Wright executed a will and testamentary trust leaving his
East India Stock in trust for the benefit of Daniel Wright Vautier, with
instructions to distribute the principal and accumulated interest to Vautier
once he attained the age of twenty-five.322 At age twenty-one, Vautier,
eager to obtain the stock (ultimately worth £2000 plus interest, then a
considerable sum),323 rather than the £100 per year the court had awarded
as maintenance, petitioned the court and sought termination of the trust. In
ruling for Vautier, the court held that a beneficiary can terminate a trust if
all the beneficiaries (here, just Vautier) are competent adults who consent to
terminating the trust.324
In contrast, in the United States, even if all the beneficiaries agree to
modify or terminate a trust, the law does not necessarily permit
modification or termination. The traditional American rule is that “a trust
cannot be terminated or modified on petition of all the beneficiaries if doing
so would be contrary to a material purpose of the settlor.”325 This
“material purpose” test is widely known as the Claflin doctrine because of
its origins in Claflin v. Claflin,326 the American counterpart to Saunders.327
In Claflin, as in Saunders, the beneficiary, Adelbert Claflin, sued to
terminate an irrevocable trust. Like Vautier, Claflin claimed that, because
he had reached the age of twenty-one and was the sole beneficiary of the
trust, he was entitled to the corpus, even though he had not yet reached
thirty, the age the settlor had specified.328 Unlike the English court in
Saunders, the American court in Claflin refused to permit the beneficiary to
terminate the trust prematurely; allowing the beneficiary to do so, the court
reasoned, would violate the settlor’s intent.329
What explains this doctrinal divergence on trust modification and
termination in the United Kingdom (and nearly all Commonwealth
countries) and the United States?330 The conventional explanation for the
321. (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch.). The rule in Saunders v. Vautier remains good law.
Indeed, in 1958, Parliament extended the scope of the rule in enacting the Variation of Trusts
Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1 (1958) (U.K.), which establishes that “a court may consent to
modification or termination of a trust on behalf of incompetent, minor, or unborn
beneficiaries if the court finds it beneficial to those beneficiaries.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 90, at 718; see also Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in AngloAmerican Trust Law, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 355, 371 (2009).
322. Saunders, 49 Eng. Rep. at 282.
323. Wright died in 1832, and £2000 then converts to over $200,000. See Eric Nye,
Pounds Sterling to Dollars:
Historical Conversion of Currency, UNIV. WYO.,
http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
324. See Saunders, 49 Eng. Rep. at 282.
325. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 719.
326. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
327. Justice Walbridge Field, writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
cites Saunders, as well as several other English cases, in his opinion. See id. at 455.
328. See id.
329. Id. at 456.
330. According to a study by Paul Matthews, the rule emanating from Saunders is found
“not only in England, but also in nearly all Commonwealth countries.” Paul Matthews, The
Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier, 122 L.Q. REV. 266, 282 (2006)
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divergence is that these legal systems, despite their common origin, have
conflicting views of dead hand control and the question of whose property
is it—the settlor’s or the beneficiaries’—once the settlor has died.331 For
the English, the donor’s intention is “not . . . of any relevance whatever,”
whereas for the Americans, the donor’s intention “ought to be carried
out.”332 And, whereas for the English, “the beneficiaries are entitled” to
use the trust property, for the Americans, “a testator has a right to dispose
of his own property.”333
Ultimately, this explanation is not satisfying, however. It may be true
that English law disregards the donor’s intention, while American law
privileges intention as the controlling consideration. It also may be true that
English law considers the trust to be the beneficiaries’ property, while
American law considers it to be, functionally, the settlor’s property.334 But
what explains these underlying differences? Is there any divergence in the
mode of legal reasoning or policy analysis that might result in such
disparate outcomes on the same issue? My hypothesis is that, in attempting
to explain these differences, the distinction between ex ante and ex post
considerations is relevant.335 Specifically, the competing approaches to the
issue of trust modification and termination may stem from a failure to
identify and distinguish between the ex ante and ex post perspective.
Ex post, the English view (Saunders) has a certain degree of plausibility.
Once a settlor is dead, it seems as if the beneficiary or beneficiaries,
assuming they all agree, should be permitted to terminate the trust and
utilize the property in whatever manner they deem best. Not permitting
modification or termination would mean the property would not be devoted
to its highest valued use. The extension of this approach in the Variation of
Trusts Act, which allows English courts to consent on behalf of
incompetent, minor, or unborn beneficiaries, might be beneficial as well.336
Again, under these circumstances, without modification or termination, the

(citing articles that discuss Saunders’s influence in Australia, Bailiwick of Jersey, Canada,
the Caribbean, Ceylon, Ireland, Nigeria, and South Africa).
331. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 718 (“What has happened in England
and the Commonwealth is that, after a trust becomes irrevocable, the trust property is
regarded as belonging to the beneficiaries, and the dead hand continues to rule only by
sufferance of the beneficiaries.”).
332. Compare Goulding v. James, (1997) 2 All E.R. 239 (C.A.) at 252 (Eng.) (Gibson,
L.J.), with Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889) (Field, J.). Lord Justice
Mummery’s opinion in Goulding is also in accord with the traditional English view.
Goulding, 2 All E.R. at 247 (Mummery, L.J.) (“The principle recognises the rights of
beneficiaries . . . to overbear and defeat the intention of a testator or settlor.”).
333. Compare Goulding, 2 All E.R. at 252 (Gibson, L.J.), with Claflin, 20 N.E. at 456
(Field, J.).
334. For a recent examination of related issues in the United States, particularly in the
context of trust investment law, see John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s
Limits on the Settlor’s Power To Direct Investment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 378–85 (2010).
335. Cf. Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 657–58 (describing trust modification and termination
as a “useful example” of “how the law balances the ex post preferences of the beneficiaries
with the ex ante wishes of the settlor”).
336. See Variation of Trusts Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1 (1958) (U.K.).
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beneficiaries would not be able to use the property in the manner they deem
best, meaning the property may not be devoted to its highest use.
Yet, once ex ante considerations are incorporated into the analysis, the
American view (Claflin) arguably has some merit. If a settlor knows the
beneficiaries can easily convince a court to modify or terminate the trust
once the settlor has died, the settlor may receive less satisfaction during life
or have less incentive to accumulate property. Moreover, the settlor may
anticipate the possibility of a court’s modifying or terminating the trust and
alter the structure or timing of the gift. Or the settlor may decide not to give
the gift at all. Indeed, once ex ante considerations are incorporated,
beneficiaries may themselves favor the American rule for precisely this
reason. Sitkoff points out that “though a particular beneficiary might prefer
the power to terminate the trust once it is established, the Claflin doctrine is
advantageous to potential beneficiaries as a class because it increases the
willingness of grantors to create a trust in the first place.”337
Of course, there are situations in which modifying or terminating an
irrevocable trust might be beneficial, even from the ex ante perspective.
One situation is if the settlor has died but a contingency arises that the
settlor could not or did not anticipate.338 Countless circumstances may
arise, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the donor to anticipate
every potential contingency. Even if it were possible, the costs of expressly
specifying each contingency could outweigh the benefits of attempting to
do so.339 If the provisions of the trust are incomplete, the inability to
modify the trust would mean a failure to carry out the donor’s probable
intent, including what the donor would have specified if the donor had the
ability and resources to address each contingency explicitly.340 For this
reason, authorizing perpetual trusts may be especially problematic, at least
in the absence of some mechanism for judicial modification.341
Incorporating the ex ante perspective is useful not only for engaging in a
comparative inquiry of trust modification and termination in the United
Kingdom and United States. The American rule, based on Claflin, has itself
been subject to varying degrees of criticism,342 and the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts and Uniform Trust Code have embraced different approaches.
Section 65 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts permits modification or
termination in cases in which doing so would be inconsistent with the
“material purpose” of a trust.343 The UTC permits modification or
termination under certain circumstances without the consent of all the
beneficiaries.344 In addition, a number of state reforms—some modeled on
337. Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 659.
338. See supra Part III.A.
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. Cf. CHESTER, supra note 28, at 47–58, 117 (advocating liberal modification of
trusts).
342. See Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 660 (noting “a strong academic and slowly emerging
decisional trend toward liberalizing these rules” of trust modification and termination).
343. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (2003).
344. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(e) (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 498 (2010).
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the Restatement, others modeled on the UTC—have altered the traditional
rules governing trust modification and termination.345
Distinguishing between ex ante and ex post considerations will be as
important in evaluating these variations on Claflin within the United States,
as in comparing the English and American approach to trust modification
and termination.346 At a minimum, the analysis should acknowledge that
overriding a material purpose (based on a judicial determination that
countervailing considerations outweigh the material purpose) or permitting
modification without all the beneficiaries’ consent (based on a judicial
determination that any nonconsenting beneficiaries will be adequately
protected) has the potential to change a settlor’s incentives. And, given the
risk of judicial intervention, settlors may decide to alter the structure or
timing of their gifts, which may be detrimental to the beneficiaries.347
B. Other Legal Limitations
Contemporary disputes about issues like conditional gifts and trust
modification and termination illustrate the relevance of the ex ante/ex post
distinction in evaluating restrictions on testamentary freedom. However,
succession law restricts testamentary freedom in several other ways. In this
section, I briefly discuss a number of these restrictions and their possible
economic justifications.
First, there are several restrictions on the permissible purposes of wills
and trusts. For example, a testator cannot execute a will and a settlor cannot
create a trust for a purpose that is illegal.348 Restrictions that discriminate
invidiously based on race or other protected categories are also invalid.349
345. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403 (West 1991 & Supp. 2013) (permitting
modification or termination, even if “continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a
material purpose of the trust,” if all beneficiaries consent and the “court, in its discretion,
determines that the reason for [modifying or terminating the trust] . . . outweighs the interest
in accomplishing a material purpose of the trust,” unless the trust contains a spendthrift
provision); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5804.11(D) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2013) (adopting
provisions analogous to UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411, 7C U.L.A. at 497–98); see also Peter J.
Wiedenbeck, Missouri’s Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine—New View of the Policy Against
Perpetuities?, 50 MO. L. REV. 805 (1985) (discussing earlier reforms to Claflin).
346. It is worth noting that even the recent variations on Claflin within the United States
differ from the U.K. approach because these U.S. variations continue to emphasize the
intent, or probable intent, of the settlor. See Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 661–63.
347. Many settlors continue to include age limitations in their trusts, like the provisions at
issue in Saunders and Claflin. For example, Whitney Houston’s will and testamentary trust
contained limitations based on the age of her primary beneficiary, her daughter Bobbi
Kristina, who was still a teenager at the time of her mother’s death. See Whitney Houston
Leaves Everything to Her Daughter, Bobbi Kristina, ABC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/entertainment/2012/03/whitney-houston-leaves-everything-toher-daughter-bobbi-kristina/ (noting that, under the testamentary trust, “the 19-year-old will
have to wait until she’s 30 to inherit everything”).
348. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(a) (“An intended trust or trust
provision is invalid if . . . its purpose or performance is unlawful or . . . its performance calls
for the commission of a criminal or tortious act.”).
349. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (holding that a racial
restriction in the bequest of land in trust was void under the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also supra notes 73–74, 230–31, 274, 293 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, as discussed above, the law prohibits a bequest if the gift is
capricious or frivolous.350 Each limitation seems justifiable because of
negative externalities (consider the social costs of encouraging crime or
discriminating against others) or perhaps due to idiosyncratic preferences
that the law ignores or discounts.351
Second, several limitations on testamentary freedom involve family
members and relatives. The spousal elective share prevents a donor from
disinheriting a surviving spouse.352 The law prohibits conditional bequests
that create unreasonable restraints on marriage.353 And courts have
invalidated terms that interfere with the mother-child relationship,354 sibling
interaction,355 and other family relationships.356
As noted above, the elective share may be necessary to prevent the
external costs that a decedent can impose on the public by disinheriting a
spouse.357 By contrast, each state (except Louisiana) allows donors to
disinherit their children, including minor children, even though a similar
type of externality might exist.358 It is an empirical question how often
such disinheritance occurs in the United States. It seems likely that most
donors provide for their children directly or give property to their surviving
spouse with the expectation that the spouse will use this property to provide
for their children. Moreover, even if a decedent does not provide for
children at all, the default rule allowing filial disinheritance is based on an
expectation that, in most of the remaining cases, a surviving spouse can
utilize the spousal elective share to support minor children.359
350. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. m (“It is against public policy
to enforce a trust provision that would divert distributions or administration from the
interests of the beneficiaries to other purposes that are capricious or frivolous.”).
351. Sometimes legal intervention is justifiable because of imperfect information, as well
as negative externalities, as in the case of the “slayer” rules governing a murdering heir. See
POSNER, supra note 19, at 693 (“The rule against allowing the testator’s murderer to inherit
thus serves the by now familiar function of reading into a contract or conveyance an implied
term to govern remote contingencies.”).
352. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. at 89–90 (Supp. 2013).
353. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009); see also supra Part
IV.A.1 (discussing Shapira).
354. See, e.g., In re Carples’ Estate, 250 N.Y.S. 680, 681–89 (Sur. Ct. 1931).
355. See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 20 A.2d 21, 27–37 (N.J. Ch. 1941).
356. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (“The policy against undermining
family relationships applies as well to trust provisions that discourage a person from living
with or caring for a parent or child or from social interaction with siblings.”).
357. See supra notes 9, 75, 233–34 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
359. Cf. Christina Donato Saler, Note, Pennsylvania Law Should No Longer Allow a
Parent’s Right to Testamentary Freedom To Outweigh the Dependent Child’s “Absolute
Right to Child Support,” 34 RUTGERS L.J. 235, 254 (2002) (discussing how, even if “the
deceased parent of a nuclear family may have disinherited his children,” marital children can
receive “indirect financial support, i.e., spousal elective share”). However, Langbein argues
that even the spousal elective share may do more harm than good. He concludes that the
intentional disinheritance of spouses is relatively rare, whereas later-in-life marriages, which
can alter a distribution of property due to the elective share, are increasingly common. See
John H. Langbein, Professor of Law, The Uniform Probate Code: Remaking of American
Succession Law (Oct. 21, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=rOiTcRdKHhI; see also Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed To Leave My
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Third, the law contains several longstanding rules, including the rule
against unreasonable restraints on alienation and rules against perpetuities
or accumulations, that restrict the transfer or accumulation of property over
time. The rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation limits the
ability of a donor to transfer property to a donee while placing significant
restrictions on the donee’s ability to transfer the property to others.360 The
rule against perpetuities invalidates certain contingent interests that may
vest too far into the future, and thereby prevents donors from exercising
control over great-grandchildren and their descendants.361 The rule against
accumulations in income “limits the time during which a settlor may direct
the trustee to accumulate and retain income in trust.”362
Overall, the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and the rule
against perpetuities may be necessary because of imperfect information. A
rule disfavoring restraints on alienation also may reduce the risk of negative
externalities in transferring property, especially if various types of complex
restraints might entail third-party information costs.363 Finally, the rule
against accumulations in income may prevent external effects that could
arise from certain individuals retaining concentrated wealth.364
Fourth, there are several restrictions on testamentary freedom that are
based on changed circumstances, including equitable deviation, trustee
removal, and cy pres. Under the equitable deviation doctrine, a court may
“modify an administrative or distributive provision of a trust, or direct or
permit the trustee to deviate from an administrative or distributive
provision, if because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the
modification or deviation will further the purposes of the trust.”365 The
justification for allowing modification due to unanticipated circumstances is
based on imperfect information. Moreover, the UTC requires that “[t]o the
extent practicable, the modification must be made in accordance with the

Property to Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned To Stop Worrying and
Start Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 793–94 (2006) (“With literally every single
disinheritance study showing de minimis rates of disinheritances that are not agreed to by the
spouse, elective share laws seem like some ridiculous school child’s Rube Goldberg
machine . . . .”).
360. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 563–72.
361. See id. at 572–92.
362. Sitkoff, supra note 238, at 501; see also Karen J. Sneddon, Comment, The Sleeper
Has Awakened: The Rule Against Accumulations and Perpetual Trusts, 76 TUL. L. REV. 189
(2001).
363. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 566–67 (discussing policy reasons against
restraints on alienation).
364. See Sitkoff, supra note 238, at 513–16 (discussing justification based on distortions
due to accumulation of wealth).
365. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) (2003).
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settlor’s probable intention.”366 This requirement helps ensure that judicial
intervention ex post will be consistent with the donor’s wishes ex ante.367
Similarly, under the UTC, a court may remove a trustee if, among other
things, “there has been a substantial change of circumstances . . . , the court
finds that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of all of the
beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and
a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.”368 Once again, the
justification for allowing trustee removal due to a change of circumstances
is based on the fact that a settlor is operating with imperfect information. In
addition, while the UTC requires that removal “best serves the interests of
all of the beneficiaries” (an ex post requirement), it also permits removal
only if doing so is “not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust”—a
requirement that incorporates a settlor’s ex ante interests and incentives.369
Likewise, the doctrine of cy pres, which applies to charitable trusts,
provides that, “if the charitable trust’s specific purpose becomes illegal,
impossible, or impracticable, the court may direct the application of the
trust property to another charitable purpose that approximates the settlor’s
general charitable intent.”370 Historically, unlike donative trusts, charitable
trusts could last forever. As a result, there is an even greater economic
justification for giving courts some flexibility to modify charitable trusts
due to a donor’s imperfect information.371 And, once again, this doctrine
incorporates the importance of the donor’s ex ante wishes because, as its
name suggests, cy pres requires a court to satisfy the donor’s intention “as
nearly as possible.”
Fifth, several recent limitations seek to restrict testamentary freedom or
authorize courts to disregard donative intent if doing so is in the best
interests of donees. For example, as discussed, the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts and UTC both allow beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust
without a change of circumstances.372 Likewise, the UTC allows a court to
remove a trustee even in the absence of changed circumstances.373 There is
a potential justification for modifying or terminating a trust due to imperfect
information or negative externalities. Similarly, there are circumstances in
366. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412, 7C U.L.A. 507 (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a (“The objective is to give effect to what the settlor’s intent probably
would have been had the circumstances in question been anticipated.”).
367. Cf. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 295, at 649 (“By making modification more
freely available, will the extension of equitable deviation to distributive provisions dissuade
potential settlors from establishing a trust in the first place?”).
368. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4), 7C U.L.A. at 575.
369. Id.
370. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 752.
371. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 696 (discussing dead hand control and cy pres
doctrine and suggesting that, “since no one can foresee the future, a rational donor knows
that his intentions might eventually be thwarted by unpredictable circumstances and may
therefore be presumed to accept implicitly a rule permitting modification of the terms of the
bequest in the event that an unforeseen change frustrates his original intention”).
372. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. at 497–98; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (2003).
373. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4), 7C U.L.A. at 575.
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which trustee removal is appropriate as the result of imperfect information.
However, there is also a significant danger that a court may modify or
terminate a trust, or remove a trustee, simply because doing so is in the ex
post interests of donees. Disregarding a donor’s intent to maximize the
donees’ ex post interests—without one of the legitimate justifications for
restricting testamentary freedom—may be socially undesirable.
Sixth, and finally, two other fundamental limitations on the donor’s
ability to transfer property at death are worth noting. The first limitation,
which is fairly uncontroversial, is that the donor may not transfer property
to donees before the donor has satisfied her creditors.374 This limitation
prevents debtors from imposing external costs on others and increasing the
price of credit.375 The second limitation, which is more controversial, is the
estate tax.376 The primary economic justification for an estate tax is based
on the negative externalities that might arise by allowing particular families
to retain concentrated wealth across generations.377 Yet, there is persistent
disagreement about the magnitude of such externalities, as well as whether
the potential benefits of imposing an estate tax exceed the costs of
administering and enforcing it.378
CONCLUSION
The organizing principle of succession law is testamentary freedom.
Facilitating donor intent is often consistent with maximizing social welfare,
but the two are not coextensive. As a result, a perennial issue is
determining the circumstances in which the legal system should intervene
to alter or modify a donor’s wishes on behalf of the donees, i.e., when
should the lives of the living trump the wishes of the dead.
There are several economic justifications for restricting the freedom of
testation, including imperfect information, negative externalities, and
intergenerational equity. Given a donor’s limited ability to foresee future
374. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 44 (noting that a core function of
probate is that “it protects creditors by providing a procedure for payment of the decedent’s
debts”).
375. See supra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.
376. There is a substantial literature in law and economics on the estate tax, and exploring
all of the relevant issues is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally POSNER, supra
note 19, at 687–92; James R. Hines, Jr., Taxing Inheritances, Taxing Estates, 63 TAX L. REV.
189 (2009). For insight into recent political battles over the estate tax, see, for example,
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH (2005). For a collection of essays analyzing many of the issues, see
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001).
377. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65 & n.61; cf. Michael J. Boskin, An Economist’s
Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 6, at
56, 57 (noting that a “major goal” of estate tax “has been—and continues to be—to decrease
the inequality in the distribution of wealth, to thwart the concentration of economic (and
with it, some argue, political) power”).
378. For a systematic approach for analyzing the costs and the benefits, see Louis
Kaplow, A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION, supra note 376, at 164, 164–215, and McCaffery, supra note 171. For an
early contribution to the law-and-economics literature that identifies some of the costs of an
estate tax, see Tullock, supra note 53.
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events and the costs of specifying even foreseeable contingencies, courts
may intercede to alter or interpret a gift due to unforeseen or unprovided-for
events. In addition, if a donor attempts to transfer property for a purpose
that is illegal (e.g., a bequest for murder) or entails other external costs
(e.g., disinheriting a spouse), the law also may have a reason to intervene.
Finally, if the present generation is transferring property in a way that
neglects the utility of future generations, perhaps intergenerational equity
also serves as a sufficient justification for restricting testamentary freedom.
However, having a court disregard a donor’s intent in order to maximize
the donees’ ex post interests, an increasingly common reason for restricting
testamentary freedom, is problematic. Doing so ignores a donor’s
happiness, a donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest, the structure and
timing of gifts, and other ex ante considerations. Interfering with a donor’s
ex ante wishes to maximize the donees’ ex post interests is detrimental from
the donor’s perspective: the court is not facilitating the donor’s wishes. In
addition, because donors can alter their gifts, disregarding donative intent to
advance the interests of particular donees may be contrary to the interests of
donees as a class. Thus, restricting testamentary freedom to maximize the
ex post interests of donees is often socially undesirable.
Many of the legal restrictions on testamentary freedom are consistent, or
at least arguably consistent, with one or more of the economic justifications
for restricting testamentary freedom. However, as discussed, there are an
increasing number of legal doctrines and law reforms, from conditional
bequests and incentive trusts to trust modification and termination, in which
courts and commentators have endorsed doctrines that maximize the ex post
benefits of donees, while failing to incorporate the ex ante incentives of
donors and the many ways in which the donor’s incentives can affect the
donees’ interests. Of course, whether intervention is warranted in any
particular context depends on the specific legal doctrine at issue and the
effects that intervention may have on the incentives of donors and donees.
Thus, there is a need for additional analysis of succession law doctrines
from an economic perspective as well as rigorous empirical study to obtain
a better understanding of the effects of these doctrines on behavior. Yet,
overall, if the legal system views testamentary freedom from an ex post,
rather than an ex ante, perspective, the ultimate outcome may be bad for
donors, bad for donees, and bad for society. In short, the living may
themselves benefit if the law allows a certain degree of dead hand control.

